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ABSTRACT
A STUDY OF BUSINESS DISLOCATION CAUSED
BY THE BOSTON CENTRAL ARTERY
by James H. Saalberg
Submitted to the Department of City and
Regional Planning on April 1, 1959, in
partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Master in City Planning
This thesis is an empirical study of some of the effects
generated when construction of a major central city highway
forces the dislocation of a large number of business establish-
ments whose premises have been taken for the building of the
roadway. The study was undertaken in the belief that the ques-
tions concerning the aislocation and relocation of existing
urban development will become increasingly important and pres-
sing as our larger cities seek to resolve their traffic prob-
lems by carving out major expressway systems in their heavily
built-up central areas.
As an approach to the subject of dislocation effects, the
author has undertaken a case study of the particular effects
generated by construction of the Boston Central Artery through
the eastern fringe of the city's downtown business district.
Four particular questions have been posed:
1. Is the dislocation caused of sufficient magnitude
to require consideration?
2. Is there a significant loss sustained in terms of
business establishments and employment to the area
and to the city so that dislocation can be said to
have definite detrimental effects, whatever the
other benefits of the construction of the highway
may be?
3. Is the pattern of spatial redistribution associ-
ated with the forced dislocation positively or
negatively related to the future development of
the urban community?
4. Are there ways by which the entire process of re-
location might be revamped so that the losses
generated can be diminished, the benefits augmen-
ted, and the entire process of urban renewal and
planning facilitated?
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In order to answer the above questions, the author studied
the relocation movements and business experience in terms of em-
ployment growth or decline of the almost 600 establishments
which lay in the path of this road and for which data was avail-
able. The study period begins in January 1950, when the route
of the Artery was formally announced and ends in 195', two
years after the completion of demolition.
The major conclusions arrived at in the course of this
study are as follows:
1. The displacement was of such magnitude and charac-
ter as to indicate that the ouestions and problems
related to relocation demand careful study and
analysis and a degree of planning not normally evi-
dent in projects of this type.
2. Despite the adverse picture found in certain sub-
categories of business activity, notably retailing,
the over-all loss of establishments and employment
engendered by the forced dislocation does not ap-
pear to be significantly greater than what might
have been expected to occur under normal circum-
stances. This appears to be true whether one looks
at the losses incurred by virtue of firms going out
of business, the losses attributable to firms mov-
ing outside the metropolitan area or the city, or
the growth experience of the firms which survived
the relocation process.
3. The pattern of spatial redistribution generated by
the Artery dislocation appears to have been posi-
tively related to the more efficient functioning
of both the businesses involved and the urban com-
munity in general.
4. The Artery experience suggests that the losses
generated in the course of the relocation process
might be diminished and the benefits augmented if
certain policies were adopted. Chief among these
would be public financial aid to defray heavy re-
location costs and a planned program, related to
general urban renewal, of aiding dislocated busi-
nesses to select new sites in the area best suited
to their particular operations and to the best
functioning of the urban economy.
Thesis Supervisor: John T. Howard
Title: Head, Department of City and Regional Planning
17
LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
April 1, 1959
Professor John T. Howard, Head
Department of City and Regional Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dear Professor Howard:
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Master in City Planning, I submit this thesis entitled "A
Study of Business Dislocation Caused by the Boston Central
Artery."
Sincerely,
VJames H. Saalberg U
VCONTEINTS
Chapter I
Chapter II
Chapter III
Chapter IV
Chapter V
Chapter VI
Chapter VII
Chapter VIII
Chapter IX
Chapter X
Appendix I
Abstract . . . . . . * . . .
Letter of Transmittal. .
Acknowledgements . . . . . .
Introduction
Focus of the Study
Method
Background on the Artery
Magnitude of Displacement
Survival
Gr owth
Spatial Movement
Impact on the City
Conclusions
Computation of "Normal"
Survival Rates
Bibliography
ii
iv
vii
1
12
19
26
32
37
50
57
74
85
102
110
vi
LIST OF TABLES ANTD MAPS
Table One
Table Two
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Table
Three
Four
Five
Six
Seven
Eight
Table Nine
Table
Table
Ten
Eleven
Table Twelve
Table
Table
Table
Map 1
Map 2
Map 3
Thirteen
Fourteen
Fifteen
Description of Establishments at Central
Artery
Comparison of Central Artery Establish-
ments with Boston City and Downtown
Survival Rates
Size Comparison of All Central Artery
Firms and Surviving Firms
Survival by Size Class
Comparison of Actual and "Expected"
Survival
Growth of Employment in Surviving Firms
Comparison of Employment Losses Through
Business Deaths with Employment Experi-
ence in Surviving Establishments
Pattern of Spatial Movement: Establish-
ments
Pattern of Spatial Movement: Employment
Pattern of Spatial Movement: Median Size
of Firm
Pattern of Spatial Movement: Employment
!tperience by Area
Impact on City: Establishments
Impact on City: Employment
Comparative Employment Trends (1950-1957)
Boston Inner Highway System
Relocation Sites of Central Artery Firms
Patterns of Concentration and Dispersion
32
35
38
40
40
4+8
51
5*4
60
61
62
69
79
80
82
27
58
67
vii
ACKNOWLEDGEM1ENTS
First, I wish to thank the Greater Boston Economic Study
Committee for giving me the opportunity while in their employ
to carry through the work necessary to develop this thesis.
I wish especially to thank Gregory Wolfe, the Committee's
Director of Research and my employer, for making available to
me much of the basic data which underlies this work and for
stimulating my thinking and encouraging me in so many ways.
I am grateful for the assistance of my co-worker,
Mrs. Phyllis Sweet of the GBESC staff, for helping me with
much of the detail work which inevitably attends this type of
study. I also wish to acknowledge my debt to my fellow plan-
ner on the GBESC staff, John Culp, for serving as an untiring
sounding board and a most generous and helpful critic. In
addition, my thanks for the cooperation of all my fellow wor-
kers-on the GBESC staff.
I want to thank the Massachusetts Division of Employment
Security for making available to me data without which this
study could not have been done and Miss Mary Wilcox, Chief
Supervisor of Research and Statistics for DES for all her
assistance and cooperation. In addition, my thanks go to
numerous people at the Boston City Planning Board, the Massa-
chusetts Department of Public Works, and the Massachusetts
Department of Labor and Industries for providing necessary
information.
A special word of thanks must go to Richard Green for his
invaluable assistance in developing map presentations and to
Miss Dulcie Jones for many hours at the typewriter.
To my thesis advisor and mentor, John T. Howard, must go
my deep appreciation for many probing comments, the right
amount of needed guidance, and for a well-timed bit of humor
in some of my darkest hours.
Last but never least, my thanks and much more go to my
wife, Ellen, without whose patience, counsel, editorial assis-
tance and black coffee this work could never have been brought
to completion.
I
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The construction of new highways produces a number of
effects. The simplest and most obvious of these is the ef-
fect on vehicular travel. Time-distance between points is
shortened. The capacity to move vehicles from place to place
is increased. Assuming the traffic generated de novo by
these combined benefits does not exceed the newly created
capacity, old roads are relieved of their excessive burdens,
the safety of travel is increased and the entire process of
moving people and goods from place to place is made more ef-
ficient and economical.
This is the immediate and surface effect. More profound,
and in the long run, far more important, is the secondary ef-
fect of highway construction, namely, the effect on land and
on the pattern of development fashioned on the land. The key
term here is accessibility, for new highways mean new patterns
of accessibility. Considered in broad scope, increased acces-
sibility may or may not mean growth for a given area. Thus,
it is a moot question yet whether areas, such as Boston, which
have declined relative to the rest of the country, will be
benefited by more efficient connections with other areas, or
whether these new channels will merely facilitate further de-
cline. Improved over-all accessibility may generate net growth
7V
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for the region or the country, but this might well be corre-
lated with increased concentration. The rich would get
richer, while the poor were preserved more cheaply.
While the broad implications of increased accessibility
remain unclear - and as yet little studied - the narrower
effects have received much attention. A major part of the
case for new highway construction has rested on the argument
that new highways stimulate new development on the lands im-
mediately adjacent to them. Dozens of studies have been car-
ried through during the past decade to demonstrate that where
new highways have been built and accessibility increased, new
business and new homes have followed. Prominent among these
studies are the Gulf Freeway Studies, the Dallas Central Ex-
pressway study, the Study of Massachusetts Route 128, and the
California Highway Department's studies.1 In general, these
lSee: (a) Norris and Elder, Consulting Engineers, A lr-Year
ETfdy of Land Values and Land Use Along the Gulf Freeway .n
the of Houston, Texas, Highway Plannig Survey, Texas
Highway DepaFtment, Houston, Texas, 1956. (b) Norris Engi-
neering Company, A Study of Land Values and Land Use Along
the Gulf Freeway IntheCi oTHouston,~ex, Higway Plan-
ning Survey, Texas Higway Department, Houston, Texas, 1951.
(c) W.D. Adkins, Effect of the Dallas Central Expresswy on
Land Values and Land Use, Texas Transportation Institute,
ETetin6, College SEEaion, Texas, September 1957. (d) A.J.
Bone and Martin Wohl, Economic Impact Study of Massachusetts
Route 128 - Industrial Development Surve_, Preliminary Re-
port),~Uambri , Mass., January 1957. (e) Studies of the
California State Highway Department appear in recent volumes
of California Hi hwa s and Public Works. (f) For an excel-
lent summary and i 1 ography of past studies, see William
L. Garrison and Marion E. Marts, Influence of Highway Improve-
ments on Urban Land - A Graphic Summary, Highway Economic
Studis Uni-verst of~Washington, -19513.
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3studies confirm what the eyes can see; along new highways new
growth, often of gigantic proportions, takes place, generally
at a pace far faster than that in other parts of the area con-
sidered. Lately, the question has been raised whether or not
much of this growth is of the illusionary kind considered
above; if in fact it is a growth carried through at the ex-
pense of draining less accessible areas. Some evidence has
been gathered which indicates that a drain does occur and that
the new development is not necessarily all "growth."12 This
same study concludes, however, that the vacant spots left in
old areas are filled in with new activities and that the over-
all effect is, therefore, -beneficial.3 With this in mind, it
remains clear, nevertheless, that new highways, by virtue of
improving accessibility, do stimulate significant development
on the land immediately adjacent to them.
There is a third impact of highway construction which
has to date received virtually no attention. This is the im-
pact resulting from the fact that highways necessarily take
up space on the land and in doing so must displace what was
previously there. The reasons this effect has been so little
studied are not hard to find. In the first place, most of
2Brigitte Orent, The Re-Use of Vacated Commercial Sites in
Downtown Boston, tpulTshed~Master 's e sis, Massachuse~ts
Institute of Technology, June 1958.
3 Since this study did not investigate the third and fourth-
round effects of this moving-up process, however, the ques-
tion of net effect for the area remains unresolved.
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the major highways built thus far in this era of massive road
construction have been constructed either in rural or in sub-
urban areas. For the most part, these roads have been laid
down through open or sparsely settled areas. Where any eco-
nomric use has been displaced at all, it was generally either
agricultural or residential. Indeed, it appears that where
structures of any kind lay in the path of these roads, the
simple expedient was adopted of moving them out of the way.
The displacement, in effect, has been minimal.
Even in the relatively few cases where highways have been
built into the heart of cities, the tendency to choose routes
along previously existing railway rights-of-way or through
open land has limited the effect of displacement. This was
clearly true in the case of the two most studied in-town high-
ways, the Gulf Freeway in Houston, Texas, and the Dallas Cen-
tral Expressway in Dallas, Texas. Since by virtue of circum-
stances and choice there has been a tendency for roads to be
built on rights-of-way where little displacement could occur,
it is not surprising that this impact has received so little
attention.
It seems likely, however, that there is a second reason
for the lack of study of this question. Although this has
never been made explicit, the impression is inescapable that
most highway impact studies have been undertaken either to
prove the benefits generated by highway construction or,
alternatively, to dispel the idea that highways have signifi-
cant harmful effects. Thus these studies have focused on
three propositions:
1. Highways cause a net dollar saving to the com-
munity in terms of increased gpsoline mileage
and decreased travelling time.
2. Highways increase the wealth of a community
by generating increased land values and ne
business activity in the surrounding area.
3.lhere highways bypass previously existing cen-
ters of business, they do not significantly
depress the business activity carried on even
by the most highway-oriented enterprises, i.e.,
gasoline servicg stations, eating places and
lodging houses.
There can be little doubt that, wittingly or unwittingly,
these studies have tended to prove a case. Since they in-
volve high public expenditures, highways necessarily become
prominent political issues. It is not surprising, therefore,
that the studies carried on to date have been undertaken or
sponsored by those most concerned with fostering these same
projects - particularly, the state highway departments - and
have tended to focus on the benefits to be derived from such
expenditures.
With this in mind, it is not hard to see why the subject
)Lloyd Aldrich, Te Economy of Freeways, City of Los Angeles,
Los Angeles, California, June, 1953, p. 3f.
5Norris & Elder, A l|-Year Study, op.cit., p. 15.
6Garrison and Marts, Influence of Highway Improvements, o.
c.it., p. 25.
6of displacement has not been studied. Displacement connotes
destruction of property and forced removal of private indiv-
iduals and business. Even if the over-all net effects should
prove beneficial to the community, it is apparent that deal-
ing with forced dislocation is a politically unpleasant
reality. As has been found to be the case so often in urban
renewal, the hostile reactions of those to be displaced cre-
ates a politically unfavorable atmosphere which may jeopardize
the proposed project completely. For those interested in the
successful completion of these projects, it must appear that
to raise the issue of displacem-jent voluntarily is to beg for
trouble. On the other hand, those who oppose the projects
either lack the resources and information to carry through a
thorough study or have no real desire to do so. After all,
the emotional display of a few partial facts it often suf-
ficient to carry the day.
As our highway program begins to move into high gear, how-
ever, it seems increasingly clear that the questions revolving
around the impact of displacement can no longer be avoided.
One of the major goals of the current road-building effort is
to relieve the mounting inadequacies of metropolitan traffic
systems and to resolve a condition of growing congestion which
threatens to choke off the life of our central cities. Under
present technological conditions and habits of travel, this
means the construction of major highway facilities directly
L"
7to, through, and around the heart of the central city itself.
A recent study reports that approximately twenty of our lar-
gest cities are planning complete inner-loop systems, while
numerous others will require partial loops or, at least, the
extension of major radials into or through the downtown area.7
Unlike their country and suburban counterparts, in-town high-
ways inevitably have more disruptive effects. Few cities have
convenient stretches of open land in and around their central
areas through which highways can be built. The number of rail-
way rights-of-way is likewise limited. Thus, for the most
part, the central city's new road network will have to be
carved out of what is already there, the congestion of land
use which typifies the central area. Inevitably, this will
mean the generation of effects of a type and magnitude not
faced in the construction of rural and suburban highways.
The peculiar problems created by the construction of in-
town highways, seem unique only if one considers these roads
solely as roads. In truth, however, these problems are no
different from those involved in all other programs of major
reconstruction within the central city area. Essentially,
the building of a new highway in the core area is an urban
renewal project. Things that were there are torn down, and
7Edgar M. Horwood and Ronald R. Boyce, The Nature of Urban
Freeway Systems Highway Economic Stud~e, Univerli-tyof
Washihgton, 195, p. 3.
8something new is built in their place. That what is built in
this case is a highway rather than apartment, office or in.
dustrial buildings is really of only secondary consequence.
Each of these naturally has its own special impact, but in
general they all involve similar questions relating to the
economic and social cost to the community and the refashion-
ing of the city's spatial structure.
It is in this light that the study of in-town highways
gains particular significance. Clearly the questions that
have been. posed concerning new highways generally, also have
relevance when applied to the in-town expressway. The bene-
fit to users in terms of saved time and decreased gasoline
costs is probably even greater proportionately when the mas-
sive congestion of the in-lying area is relieved. The fact
that new highways stimulate development in surrounding areas
is probably as true when related to the central city. Poten-
tially this probability has great significance, for it offers
hope of significant new growth which may help resolve the
stifling fiscal problems, sapping the energies and halting
the progress of so many metropolitan centers. But it is be-
cause in-town highways, like all other public renewal pro-
,ects, exact or appear to exact special costs and because
they patently do force significant relocation on the land
that they deserve particular attention.
It is with this in mind and from this point of view that
the present study of Boston's Central Artery has been under-
taken. Actually, this study deals with the Central Artery
not so much as a road but as a major public reconstruction
project. Within this context, questions concerning traffic
generation and the efficiency of vehicular movement have been
completely ignored. In addition, questions concerning the
generation of new land values and new economic activity have
been largely overlooked. These latter questions certainly
have relevance to any consideration of the effect highways
have in reshaping the form and function of the city. They
deserve more study, but within this context the basic ques-
tions have been raised, the basic hypotheses have been formu-
lated, and the basic methods for study have been developed.
The particular question that will be dealt with in this paper
concerns the as yet little-studied effects generated by the
displacement these huge renewal projects cause.
That this problem is one of significant proportions can
be illustrated with a few pertinent facts. A recent study
indicated that among eight urban areas studied, the average
miles of freeway p!sem for construction is 11 per 100,000
population.8 Even assuming these roads used no more land
than the normal suburban highway, or between 20 and 30 acres
bid.., p. 30.
J
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per mile,9 this would mean an average consumption of 200 to
300 acres of land for each 100,000 people in the area. For
the Boston urbanized area this would mean a use of between
4,000 and 6,000 acres of land.10 More dramatic, however,
will be the consumption of land in the heart of the city. Key
to all in-town highway systems will be the inner-loops. Be-.
cause of the greater frequency of entrance and exit ramps on
these roads, it is estimated that they will consume up to 40
acres of land per mile exclusive of major interchanges.I On
this basis, the average land consumption for these inner loops
alone will be well over 200 acres each, with something approach-
ing an equivalent amount of land required above this for the
construction of interchanges with the major radials feeding
into the loop.12 The average central area enclosed by one of
these inner-loops approximates two square miles.13 On this
basis the average inner loop with its major interchanges will
take up a land area equivalent to over one-quarter of the cen-
tral core it has been built to serve. Except where circum-
stances favor the city with a convenient stretch of open land
9Edgar M. Horwood and Ronald R. Boyce, Measurement of Central
Business District Change and Urban ghy Impact, Highway
Economic Studies, Universityf of Washington, 1959, p. 5.
10Based on Boston 1950 Urbanized Area Population of 2.2 million,
United States Census of Population: 1950 - General Character-
istics - MassachuseTts, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the
Census, Washington, D.C., 1952, pp. 21-35.
llHorwood and Boyce, Urban Freeway Systems, Op.cit., p. 31.
1 2Ibid., p. 31.
13Ibid., p. 30.
or railroad right-of-way, the construction of this one key
facility will mean the displacement of several hundred acres
of existing housing, and commercial or industrial develop-
ment. Indeed, at the pace renewal in the strict sense is
progressing at this time, it does not seem unreasonable to
suggest that this in-town highway construction may constitute
the major public force reshaping the city during the next
decade.
I
1CHAPTER II
FOCUS OF THE STUDY
This study focuses specifically on the impact construc-
tion of the Central Artery had on the Boston area in terms of
the dislocation of business activity. The broad area of resi-
dential dislocation is not treated here primarily because the
Central Artery in fact displaced relatively few residential
units. Even had residential dislocation of a significant mag-
itude taken place, there would be good reason to separate a
study of this impact from one concerning the effect on busi-
ness activity. The factors involved in residential reloca-
tions are quite different from those involved in business re-
location. To cite only the most obvious differences, house-
hold units, if forced to move, must move somewhere, while
business units have the additional "choice"? of ceasing to
exist. Furthermore, the choice available to individuals in
choosing new places to live is, in most instances, far greater
than that open to businessmen in relocating their establish-
ments. Perhaps most important, decisions within the business
sphere are made primarily on the basis of economic cost and
probable effect on future business volume, while decisions on
residential movement contain a large element of personal taste
and desire.
The approach of this study will be to deal first with
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four general topics. The first concerns the magnitude of the
dislocation caused by construction of the Central Artery
(Chapter V). The second focuses on the pattern of business
failure - voluntary and involuntary - related to the road's
construction (Chapter VI). The third and fourth center on
the establishments which survived the Artery dislocation.
The former concerns the growth experience of the firms affec-
ted (Chapter VII). The latter deals with the pattern of
spatial movement generated as a result of the forced reloca-
tion (Chapter VIII). All of these questions will be answered
in terms of establishments and employment. These two measures
of business activity are used here, not necessarily because
they are the best, but because they are the only ones readily
available. Ideally, they should be supplemented by measures
of space, business volume and property value, particularly
where questions of growth experience are concerned. In terms
of the time and resources allotted to this study, however, this
material was impossible to obtain.
Following the general discussion, we shall deal with the
question of the immediate impact on the city in terms of loss
or gain of business activity (Chapter IX). The final chapter
will summarize and discuss the conclusions. It will also deal
with some of the implications which may be drawn from these
conclusions in terms of changing patterns of urban activity
and of the need for public policies to facilitate these changes.
This study aims at answering four general questions.
First, we will ask whether the relocation is of such magni-
tude and character as to require study and consideration. Sec-
ond, we will inquire whether or not the losses sustained in
the relocation process are sufficiently great so that one may
conclude that they constitute a definite detrimental effect,
whatever the other benefits of the particular project may be.
Third, we will ask if the pattern of spatial redistribution
associated with the forced dislocation is positively or nega-
tively related to the proper functioning of the urban commu-
nity. Fihally, we will turn to the question of how the en-
tire process of relocation might be revamped so that the
losses it generates might be diminished, the benefits augmen-
ted, and the entire process of urban renewal and planning
facilitated.
In answering these questions, this study will arrive at
the following major conclusions:
1. The displacement was of such magnitude and character
as to indicate that the questions and problems related to re-
location demand careful study and analysis and a degree of
planning not normally evident. The additional point will be
made that the need for more attention being given to this
process is all the more urgent, when one realizes that in
most cities the process of urban renewal will cause major re-
location to occur many times over.
2. The losses of establishments and employment engendered
by the forced dislocation do not appear to be significantly
greater than what might have been expected to occur under nor-
mal circumstances. This appears to be true whether one looks
at the losses incurred by virtue of firms going out of busi-
ness, the losses attributable to firms moving outside the
metropolitan area or the city, or the growth experience of
the firms which survived the relocation process. This is a
general result and not necessarily true of all sub-categories
of economic activity. Abnormal losses do appear to have
occurred in retailing and in one segment of the food industry.
The city itself also suffered a significant loss of metal
products wholesalers and manufacturers. Each of these, how-
ever, represents a special case, which will be discussed in
the body of this work.
3. The pattern of spatial redistribution generated by the
Artery dislocation appears to have been positively related to
the more efficient functioning of both the businesses in-
volved and the urban community in general. Thus, major hand-
lers of goods - manufacturers and wholesalers - showed a ten-
dency to move outside of the congested core area. This was
particularly true of firms with major or special space demands
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and in activities which appear no longer to have overriding
reasons for remaining in the core. Generally, those activi-
ties which did remain in the core appear to be those which
can more easily adapt central space to their needs and which
have major reasons to be in the core because of their pecu-
liar markets or because of special communications require-
ments. In general, this pattern of movement appears to have
been validated by the figures on employment growth and de-
cline. Those manufacturers and wholesalers who moved away
from the core did better than those who remained in the cen-
ter. Only where real ties to the center remained strong did
business experience seem to validate decisions to remain in
the center.
From the city's point of view, it appears possible to con-
clude that the pattern generated was beneficial from several
standpoints. First, while it is true that a large number of
firms did move outside the core, it is equally true that the
dominant tendency was to remain in the city, and generally in
the central area. This indicates that the central area still
has significant vitality. Second, it appears that the busi-
nesses which did move outside the core, far from being damagid,
were benefited by the relocation; these businesses tended
either to post gains compensating in part for some of the real
loss suffered during the relocation process or to show trends
IV
somewhat better than the general run of establishments in the
city. This indicates that the relocation process, if proper-
ly handled, may brighten the prospects for the retention and
even revitalization of some manufacturing and wholesaling
activities in the central area. Finally, it must be pointed
out that these results appear to have been accomplished while
at the same time the core area was being relieved of major
sources of traffic congestion. Even if the results of the
relocation from a business point of view were only neutral,
the diminution of the traffic problem would stand as a major
gain from the city's point of view.
4. Finally it will be concluded that the losses gener-
ated by the Artery relocation might have been diminished and
the benefits augmented if certain policies had been adopted.
Concerning the first, we will conclude that some assistance
should have been made available in the form of public finan-
cial aid to defray the heavy costs of relocation. Such aid
is currently available under urban renewal legislation. It
is argued that this aid should be adopted as part of the pro-
gram of highway construction, particularly since the construc-
tion of in-town highways will involve an increasingly large
amount of relocation.
Concerning the augmentation of benefits, it is concluded
that if the process of relocation were tied in with the over-
all program of urban renewal, the positive results of the
spatial redistribution could be significantly increased. The
knowledge gained from past relocation programs should be made
available to firms currently facing the problem. Beyond this,
a positive program of persuading firms to choose more suitable
new locations seems to be a logical step to take. The most
effective means would be to offer firms which do move accor-
ding to the desired pattern bonus aid payments. Fihally, it
will be argued that relocation should be tied in with other
renewal projects. Such coordinated programming would benefit
both the firms involved and the urban community in general.
It would at once provide businesses with better locations
from which to carry on their activities, while at the same
time fostering the fulfillment of a more efficient, produc-
tive and satisfying pattern of land use for the city.
29
CHAPTER III
METHOD
The following steps were involved in developing the data
for this study. First, it was necessary to determine what
firms were affected by the construction of the Central Artery.
Second, it was necessary to determine (a) whether these firms
ceased to exist or survived the dislocation and (b) if they
survived, where they moved.o. Third, since employment was
to be used as the primary measure of business experience, it
was necessary to gather employment statistics for these firms
as of the time they were located at the Artery and at some
point in time following their move from the Artery. While
each of these steps seems straightforward, all of them in-
volved complications, the resolving of which set limitations
on the validity of the entire effort.
One immediate limitation was set by the source of the
data. A major part of the material for the study was gath-
ered from the Massachusetts State Division of Employment
Security (DES). This includes all employment figures, acti-
vity classification data,1 and material concerning the his-
tory of the establishments. The latter was important since
IEstablishments were classified according to the U.S. Depart-
ment of Labor Standard Industrial Classification Code
assigned to ther by DES.
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it was necessary to take into account the probability that a
humber of businesses would have changed name, ownership, or
become involved in mergers during the period under study.
This material would have been unclear, had a normal city direc-
tory been used. Since DES data form such a basic part of the
study, the firms studied had to be limited to those covered
by the State Unemployment Insurance Act.
The effect of this was to exclude the following major
classifications: small firms, essentially single proprietor-
ships not required to report to DES; railway employees,
covered under a separate act; and government employment, also
covered under separate legislation. A review of the estab-
lishments in the area indicated that there was very little in
the way of either railroad or government employment affected;
therefore, this forced exclusion does not significantly
affect the results of the study. However, it does appear
that upwards of 300 establishments listed as having been in
the Central Artery area were not covered by pES.2 Most of
these undoubtedly were small. Therefore, the effect, in terms
of employment, was slight. However, since many of the conclu-
sions are given in part or in whole in terms of establishments,
the exclusion of some 300 out of a possible total of 1,000
2These are firms which appear in Polk's directory, but for
which no records could be found at DES.
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does constitute a significant limitation.3 The results must
be read with this in mind.
The problem of determining which establishments were af-
fected by the construction of the Central Artery was essen-
tially one of reconstructing history. Some material was
available from the Boston City Planning Board on the firms
located at Artery sites at the time of condemnation. This
material, however, covered only the first part of the Artery.
In addition, conversations with people affected by the Artery
made it evident that a number of firms, anticipating evictio;
had moved as much as several years prior to the time of con-
demnation. For these reasons, it was decided to establish
cut-off dates and to include those firms at Artery sites at
these times. The two dates chosen were January 1, 1950, for
3Employment is somewhat further understated because of the fact
that owners of unincorporated firms are not covered under t1
ungmployment insurance act. Therefore, they are not included
in the employment figures reported by DES, even though they
are working members of their firms. In corporations, all em-
ployees, including officers and directors, are covered. The
effect of the exclusion of owners of unincorporated businesses
is undoubtedly slight - probably amounting to an underestima-
tion of no more than 200 or 300 in total employment. Even if
this number were added to the employment not included because
of the exclusion of non-covered firms (probably between 300
and 500), the total underestimation is probably no more than
700-800, or about ten per cent of the total employment devel-
oped from DES data. This difference is not insignificant,
but it does not appear to invalidate any of the conclusions
drawn in this study.
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the section of the Artery running from North Station to Fort
Hill Square and January 1, 1954, for the section of the
Artery running from Fort Hill Square to Harvard Street. These
dates coincided roughly with the dates on which the official
routes for these separate sections of the Artery were made
public.4 However, the general route of the Artery had been
known since 1948. The choice of the 1950 and 1954 dates thus
introduces another source of error. Undoubtedly some firms
which did move in anticipation of Artery construction have
been excluded from the study. On the other hand, it is known
that some of the firms included in the study moved for reasons
other than forced dislocation.5 The assumption is made that
these two effects tend to cancel each other out.
The list of establishments studied was developed by draw-
ing from Polk's 1950 City Directory all those establishments
found to be at addresses taken for the Central Artery. Adjust-
4Material on dates was provided by Mass. Dept. of Public Works.
5These firms were included originally because of the arbitrary
way in which the initial list had to be drawn. Where it be-
came known early enough in the study that firms had moved for
reasons other than forced eviction, these firms were removed
from the study. However, past a certain point in time, re-
tabulation became unfeasible. Thus, it is known that at least
three firms are included which should not have been. In total,
on the basis of a subsequent questionnaire, however, it is
not believed that the number mistakenly included is high -
probably no more than five per cent of the total. As the
text states, this number is probably balanced by an equivalent
number which should have been included but were not.
ments were made by checking with Polk's 195+ City Directory
to take into account firms which moved into and out of second
half Artery locations between 1950 and 1954.
The date chosen for developing before and after compari-
sons was the year 1957. Establishments that were listed by
DES as having been suspended (i.e., no longer under coverage)
and which were listed neither in Polk's 1957 City Directory
nor in the 1957 Boston City Telephohe Directory were assumed
to have gone out of business. These firms are counted as
"deaths." Again, this is an approximation since there are no
records available. The location of those firms which did sur-
vive was determined by using the 1957 Boston Telephone Direc-
tory and, in a few cases, DES records.
Employment statistics were taken in toto from DES rec-
ords. For firms in the first half of the Artery, employment
as of September, 1950, was used, while for firms in the sec-
ond half of the Artery, September, 1954, employment figures
were used.6 This procedure was used because of the desire to
estimate as accurately as possible the employment actually
displaced by construction of the Artery. A later check re-
vealed that, had the 1950 figures been used throughout, the
total difference would have been less than one per cent. i%e
6 The month of September was used on advice from DES that it
is the most normal employment month of the year.
I1
differences within the detailed categories would have been
somewhat larger, but with one exception where the use of 1950
figures would have boosted the sub-total used in the study by
nine per cent, use of 1950 data would have changed the totals
used in this study by no more than several percentage points
in either direction. Where comparisons are made using only
the Artery data, the effects of these differences can be con-
sidered of little significance. The question does arise, how-
ever, whether the comparisons made between Artery trends and
city trends are valid, since the city figures are based on
changes occurring between 1950 and 1957. A study of the data
indicates that in no case would the conclusions reported be
significantly different if 1950 Artery figures had been used.
The author feels now that it would have been simpler and more
direct to use a single date for establishing the base employ-
ment figures, and he suggests that in future studies of this
type such a procedure be adopted.
In general, the statistics developed and the mapping pro-
cedures used are quite straightforward and require little
elaboration. One note seems necessary concerning the use of
the median to describe the average size of firms. As might
be expected, the distribution of the firms was positively
skewed in favor of the small firms. The use of a simple
arithmetic mean would therefore have given an unclear picture
of the size distribution of firms since it would have given
excessive weight to the few large firms. Where such a dis-
tribution exists, the median is the most valid expression of
the average.
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CHAPTER IV
BACKGROUND ON THE ARTERY
The Boston Central Artery is an express highway approxi-
mately four miles in length extending from Charlestown in the
north, to a connection with the Southeast Expressway just
south of the peninsula containing the core of the city (see
Map 1). The highway is intended to act as a distributor of
traffic to Boston's downtown area, to connect the Northeast
and Southeast Expressway radials presently under construction,
and eventually to form part of the Inner Belt loop which will
surround the central section of the city and function as the
master link in the central city's highway system. The first
half of the road is on an elevated structure, the next half
mile is tunnelled, and the last mile and a half is again
elevated. Total cost of the road, which has taken more than
eight years to build (construction is not yet completed), has
been approximately lf0 million dollars or between 30 and '35
million dollars per mile.* This short stretch of highway thus
ranks as the most expensive piece of road yet constructed in
the United States.
The particular section of the Central Artery which is
the subject of this study, is the one and one-half mile strip
running from North Station just past the crossing of the
Charles River through the eastern fringe of the downtown, to
*Figure reported by Mass. Department of Public Works.
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Ithe point where the highway comes above ground from its tun-
nel at Harvard Street. This section of the highway was built
essentially in two parts. The first half of the route, run-
ning to Fort Hill Square over an elevated structure, was
announced in 1950. The period from the start of condemnation
to the final completion of demolition ran from November, 1950
through June, 195+. The road was finally opened for use in
November, 1955. The route for the second half of the Artery
was not settled finally until March, 195+. Condemnation for
the second half of the Artery was begun in June, 1954, and
demolition was completed in May, 1956. As yet this second
half, including essentially the tunnelled portion of the
Artery, is not complete, and only the portion to Essex Street
Just past South Station is open.
These are the.bare facts concerning the Central Artery.
They do not make inspiring reading, and reported so long after
the fact, they seem rather lifeless. Yet, the truth is that
the creation of the Central Artery was not a simple affair.
The years prior to actual construction effort were filled with
constant controversy between those who saw the Artery as the
fulfillment of an absolute necessity and those who viewed it
virtually as a destructive weapon pointed at the heart of the
city.1 The proponents argued that the Artery wgs vitally
lBackground material on the Artery was gathered from articles
appearing in the Christian Science Monitor between the years
1948 and 1956.
needed to relieve the growing traffic congestion of the down-.
town and to open up the declining commercial center of the
city once more to easy access from the metropolitan hinter-
land. They also argued that the construction of the route
would revivify the seedy eastern extremity of the downtown
area and lead to significant and badly needed new building in
the core of Boston.
Opponents focused on the destructive effects that inevi-
tably would attend the construction of the road. They pointed
to the fact that hundreds of businesses would be displaced and
argued that many of these, unable to stand the cost of moving
or to find suitable new locations within Boston, would be
lost to the city. They argued that major districts of the
city's business community would be split or significantly
eaten into, notably the food, apparel, leather and printing
areas. They pointed to the 100 families which would be dis-
placed by the road. And, inevitably they stressed the fact
that some 28 million dollars in assessed valuations would be
removed from the city's already shrinking tax rolls. The
arguments were heated, to say the least, and gave a foretaste
of what may be expected as nationwide programs of in-town
highway building accelerate in coming years. The remainder
of this paper is aimed at shedding some light on one parti-
cular aspect of this controversy, namely the effects generated
when a highway like the Central Artery dislocates hundreds of
businesses and thousands of workers in a central city area.
CHAPTER V
MAGNITUDE OF DISPLACEMENT
The area through which the Central Artery was built forms
for the most part a district of wholesaling and light mann-
facturing on the eastern fringe of Boston's downtown. It is
not surprising, therefore, that the bulk of the establishments
and employment displaced were engaged in these two activities.
In particular, four clearly defined districts were penetrated
by the Artery. The food market district, running from Dock
Square east to the harbor, was sliced in two, as was the prin-
ting district, immediately to the south. Below the printing
district, the Artery cut through a mixed border area between
the apparel and leather districts.
In total, and within the definitions established by this
study, the Artery displaced some 573 establishments employing
7,160 persons. This is probably a minimum estimate.2 As
1The definition of the downtown used throughout this study is
with minor differences the same as that used by the Greater
Boston Economic Study Committee, and coincides generally with
the definition used by the Boston City Planning Board.
2Taking into account the limitations of the DES data, the
actual number of establishments displaced by the Central
Artery was probably closer to 900; the actual working force
displaced was probably about 8,000 (see Chapter III, pp. 21-
22 and Footnote 3). This difference does not, however, in-
validate the Artery-city comparisons to be made below, since
the city data has also been developed from DES material and
therefore has the same limitations.
TABLE ONE
DESCRIPTION OF ESTABLISEMENTS AT CENTRAL ARTERY
Activity Establishments
No. 9
Employment
No. %
Median Size
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND )*.
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other Non-Durable
Metal Products (D)*
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking & Trans.
Construction
*ND - Non durable;
573
157
7
12
29
36
30
25
18
242
29
56
24
65
38
30
99
47
12
16
100
27
1
2
5
6
5
4
42
5
10
4
11
7
5
17
8
2
3
7160 100
3401
556
581
717
701
275
358
213
2445
631
501
274
524
247
268
676
371
136
131
D - Durable
SIZE BREAKDOWN
Establishments
No. %
Employment
No. %
578264
136
91 16
54 9
20 4
8
1249
1625
1308
1516
8
12
18
23
21
General Note: Per cent sub-totals may not balance because
of rounding.
5.8
9.1
60.0
9.9
15.0
9.9
5.6
7.9
7.5
4.9
12.3
4.0
4.6
3.8
7.3
48
8
8
10
10
4
3
34
9
7
4
7
9
5
2
2
6.7
Class
10-19
20-49
50-99
100,.1
3,3
Table One shows, manufacturing and wholesaling accounted for
69 per cent of the establishments and 82 per cent of the em-
ployment displaced. The remainder was composed of ancillary
retail and service activities. The largest portion of estab-
lishments and employment was engaged in the four activities
described above. Taken together, food, printing, apparel and
leather manufacturing and wholesaling accounted for 40 per
cent of all establishments and almost 60 per cent of all em-
ployment.3 The only other large component was metal whole-
saling and manufacturing, which accounted for 15 per cent of
the establishments and 12 per cent of the employment. Food
manufacturing and wholesaling loomed particularly large,
making up 18 per cent of the establishments and almost one-
third of all employment.
The bulk of the establishments displaced were small. The
median size was 5.8 employees, and 86 per cent of the estab-
lishments had fewer than 20 employees. Only eight employed
100 or more. Manufacturing firms tended to be larger than
3Note on Termi: To avoid complexities of language, the
following short terms will be used throughout this study to
refer to the detailed categories.
1. Other food, referring to manufacturers or wholesalers of
food products other than meat.
2. Aparel referring to the combined categories of apparel
and textile wholesalers and manufacturers.
3. Printing, referring to the combined category of printing
and publishing
4. Leather, referring to the combined categories of leather
and shoe wholesaling and manufacturing.
3L4
average, and therefore, while the number of establishments en-
gaged in manufacturing was fewer than in wholesaling, manu-
facturing loomed largest when measured by employment (+8 per
cent of the total). Meat manufacturers were particularly large
(median size, 60); thus, the seven establishments in this
category (one per cent of the total) accounted for eight per
cent of all employment. Meat wholesalers, apparel manufac-
turers, and miscellaneous wholesalers (primarily chemical,
paper and furniture) were also notably above the average size
for the group as a whole and for their particular sub-groups.
When the Artery figures are compared with the totals for
Boston and the downtown, it becomes apparent that the dis-
placement did affect a significant, and in several cases a
very significant, segment of establishments and employment in
the city. As Table Two shows, the Artery displaced approxi-
mately two per cent of all the establishments and employment
in the city. Compared to the downtown, it displaced five per
cent of the establishments and four per cent of the employ-
ment. The meat manufacturers, while few in number, amounted
to one-fifth of all those in the city and employed almost one-
quarter of all those engaged in this industry. The relative
magnitude of the displacement was also notable in other food
manufacturing (particularly in terms of establishments), prin-
ting and metal products wholesaling and manufacturing. In
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COMPARISON OF CENTRAL ARTERY ESTABLISHMENTS ]WIT
BOSTON CITY AND DOWNTOWN
Activity Establishments Dployment
%of DT % of City % of DT % of City
Total 2 + 2
Manufacturing 11 5 10 3
Meat (ND) 35 20 42 23
Other Food (ND) 20 5 31
Apparel (ND) 5 3
Printing (ND)1  10 7 12
Other Non Durable2  15 5 4 2
Metal Products (D) 17 5 13 2
Other Durable 17 5 21 2
Wholesaling 7 5 9 5
Food3 20 11 26 11
Metal Pro ucts3  1+ 8 9 5
All other 5 1+ 6 3
Retail 5 1 2 1
Services 1 1 1 *
Trucking 10 2 5 1
Construction 5 1 1 1
* Less than one-half of one per cent
1. Excluding publishing
2. Including publishing
3. Excluding brokers, agents, and manufacturers' sales
branches
1+. Includes all others, plus brokers, agents, and
manufacturers' sales branches.
rN
summary, the data reveals that this short one and one-half mile
of Central Artery construction did displace a significant pro-
portion of the city's business activity. A particularly
large segment of the production and distribution activity of
the city was dislocated, and in several specific activities
what must be regarded as major relocation was forced.
CHAPTER VI
SURVIVAL
The first effect we shall deal with in attempting to
arrive at some over-all conclusions on the positive or neg-
ative result of the Artery dislocation concerns the number of
establishments which went out of' business between the time
they were forced to relocate from the Central Artery and the
cut-off date of the study, mid-1957. Stated simply, this is
the question of survival.
Recognizing the limitations of the data,l Table Three,
nevertheless, seems to indicate certain tenable conclusions.
First, it appears that the great bulk of the establishments
did survive relocation from their Central Artery places of
business. Over-all, almost four-fifths of the 573 Artery
establishments were still in existence in 1957. Survival
rates were generally higher than average in the manufacturing
and wholesaling components which formed the bulk of the acti-
vity displaced from the Artery area. Only in the other food
manufacturing and wholesaling categories were the survival
rates below the general average. The possible significance
1 It should be pointed out here again that only those firms
which, in 1957, had ceased to be covered by DES and could not
be located either in Polk's Directory or in the Boston area
telephone book were classed as having ceased to exist. Since
no data are gathered either by the city or the state on firms
which come into and go out of existence, no check as to the
accuracy of this method is possible.
r
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TABLE THREE
SURVIVAL RATES
Establishments
CA* s. %
Employment
CA S
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other Non-durable
Metal Products
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking, Trans.
Construction
573 +55
157
7
12
29
36
30
25
18
242
29
56
24
65
38
30
135
6
7
25
35
25
22
15
205
24
42
23
55
35
26
79
86
86
58
86
?7
88A83
85
83
75
96
85
92
87
99 55
47 41 87
12 9 75
16 10 63
7160 6369 89
3401
556
581
717
701
275
358
213
2445
631
501
274
524
247
268
3163
476
560
619
700
248
352
208
2229
587
426
256
481
238
241
9386
86
99
90
98
98
91
93
85
93
92
96
90
676 422 62
371 349 94
136 132 97
131 74 56
*CA - All Central Artery
S. - Number Surviving
f% -Per cent of CA that survived.
k
of this fact will be dealt with below when more evidence has
been adduced. The notable disappearance of retail establish-
ments will be discussed shortly below.
It is apparent that, in general, survival rates were
higher among the larger firms than among the smaller ones, and
that the larger a firm was, the greater was its chance of sur-
viving. Thus, over-all, while the surviving firms accounted
for only 79 per cent of all those located at the Artery, they
included some 89 per cent of the employment. A comparison of
the median size of all firms at their Artery locations with
the median size of surviving firms at their Artery locations
gives the same picture. The over-all median was 5.8 employees;
the median of those which survived was 6.6. As an examination
of Table Four will show, the picture was generally true for
most categories; the surviving establishments in each category
were generally larger than the total Artery average for that
category. When establishments are separated by size class as
in Table Five, this picture is once again confirmed: the lar-
ger the firm, the greater its chances of survival.
This result is not unexpected. Quite obviously, smaller
firms with less capital available to them could less afford
to stand the costs of relocation. They, therefore, went out
of business in greater numbers. This tendency was aggravated
by the fact that the Central Artery area had been characterized
r4
TABLE FOUR
SZE COMPARISON OF ALL CA FIRMS AI SURVIVING FIRMS
Activity
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other Non-Durable
Metal Products (D)
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking, Trans.
Construction
Median Size (No. of Employees)
All CA Firms _ Surviving Firms (19501
5.8
9.1
60*0
9.9
15.0
9.9
5.6
7.9
7.5
4.99
12.
4.1
4.0
4.6
3.8
7.3
6.7
6.6
9.9
49.0
27.5
15.8
10.5
6.1
9.2
8.8
5.2
12.5
1+.0
7.2
9.2
7.5
TABLE FIV
SURVIVAL BY SIZE CLASS
Size Class Establishments
CA S $ CA
Employment
S
261+
136
91
193
111
76
73
82
84
51+ 1+9 91
20 18 90
884
121+9 1050
1625 1487
1308 1158
1516 100
0-14
5-9
10-19
20-49
50-99
l00,t
432
726
75
82
84
92
89
CA , S' %-
8 15168 loo0
4T
by low rents. Once the Artery removed some millions of square
feet of floor space while at the same time forcing hundreds of
business firms to seek new locations within a short period of
time, rents in the area went up significantly.2 Faced with
the cost of moving in the first instance, the economically
more vulnerable small establishments were equally less able
to stand the increased rent costs. That smaller firms show a
2Figures developed by the Boston City Planning Board show that
the first half of the Artery alone caused the destruction of
2.7+ million square feet of floor space. The figure for the
second half of the Artery is not known, but it may be assumed
to have been roughly similar to the first half total. All
told, probably some five million or more square feet of
usable floor space were demolished in the course of Artery
construction. A 1953 space inventory prepared by the Bos-
ton Planning Board indicated that only two and one-quarter
million square feet of vacant second class floor space, the
type predominant in the Artery area, existed in the entire
downtown. True, this study occurred after much of the demo-
lition for the first half of the Artery had taken place.
But it occurred before the demolition for the second half
had begun. Thus, it appears that the second half of the
Artery alone probably removed an amount of floor space rough-
ly equivalent to the total amount of similar vacant space in
existence in the downtown at the time. An unknown portion
of this vacant space was itself in the Artery area, and
therefore was removed by further demolition. With these
facts in mind, it is not difficult to see why rents went up.
As early as December 1951, the Christian Science Moni-
tor reported the then Commissioner of the Massachusetts De-
partment of Public Works, William F. Callahan, as stating
that tmost businesses, industries, and homeowners in demol-
ished areas have so far found places to go, but many have had
to pay very high rates for space...."' This referred to the
effect of the early stages of dislocation. Conversations
with a number of individuals forced out by later stages of
construction indicate that this boosting of space costs con-
tinued to take place.
lower rate of survival than larger ones, was to be expected in
any case. National figures indicate that smaller firms gener-
ally disappear at a faster rate than larger ones.3 However,
the fact that in this case the demise was associated with a
forced relocation leads to certain questions of public policy
which will be discussed in the concluding section of this
paper.
The particularly sharp loss of retail establishments,
measured either by employment or by establishments, deserves
special note. Only 56 per cent of the retail establishments
survived, while the general average was 79 per cent. In part
this picture can be related to the excessive demise of small
firms. Retail establishments generally were smaller than
average. Their median size was 4.6 employees, compared with
the over-all average of 5.8. Yet, this is obviously not a
sufficient explanation. The median size of retail establish-
ments was little different from that found in wholesaling
generally or in the service area, yet the survival rate for
the retailing was far lower. The conclusion is inescapable
that retail activity was particularly hard-hit by Central
Artery dislocation.
The reasons for this are not hard to deduce. Most of
the retail activity in the area consisted of eating and
3 This material is drawn from the Survey of Current Business.
Detailed citations may be found in Appendix I.
drinking establishments, food shops, and a miscellany of small
clothing and general merchandise establishments. The bulk 6f
these apparently were dependent on the business generated by
the employees and businesses located in the Artery area. When
these were reduced sharply by the relocation, the potential
for retail trade was also reduced. In all probability, this
loss of opportunity for retail business was counter-balanced
in part by the expansion of retail business in areas to which
displaced Artery firms moved. However, except in the Newmar-
ket district to which the meat dealers moved in mass and pos-
sibly in South Boston, the relocated Artery firms did not con-
stitute a significant proportion of the firms already in the
areas to which they moved. Thus, it may be presumed that the
retail business they generated could be taken up easily by ex-
pansion of retail establishments already operating in these
destination areas. The conclusion seems inescapable that the
Artery dislocation did cause a real loss of business oppor-
tunity for the Artery retail establishments. It seems prob-
able that it was this fact, coupled with the difficulties
facing small firms in meeting relocation costs in any case,
which accounts for the severe loss which occurred among the
Artery retail group.
There can be no doubt that a number of the firms which
were located at the Central Artery were no longer in business
as of 1957. The question remains to be asked whether there is
any significance to this fact: did the firms go out of busi-
ness because they were forced to relocate; did they go out of
business in numbers greater than might have been expected
under normal conditions and assuming the Artery had not forced
their removal? Ideally, the answer to the first of these
questions should be based on a knowledge of what motive was
behind the discontinuance of the establishments involved. Un-
fortunately, this information is for all practical purposes
impossible to get. The firms are no longer there, and no pub-
lic records are kept which would shed light on the matter.
Material on the second question is almost as difficult to
arrive at, primarily because of the difficulty of developing
figures on what might have been expected to occur under nor-
mal conditions; that is, the number of Artery firms that
might have been expected to survive had relocation not taken
place. The only relatively complete data which seems to be
available is that covering annual rates of discontinuance of
business firms for the nation as a whole. These rates are
developed by the U.S. Department of Commerce on the basis of
firms covered under the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance pro-
gram (Social Security) and are reported periodically in the
Survey of Current Business published by this government agency.
Despite the fact that the social security data used in the
development of the national average is based on broader cover-
age of firms, including specifically the smaller firms not
covered under the unemployment insurance program, the use of
these national figures appears to be valid, particularly since
a size adjustment must be made in any case. Thus, by applying
the national rates, with necessary adjustments, to the group
of Artery firms, it is possible to develop a picture of the
number of firms which might have been expected to survive
under "normal" conditions. These "normal" figures may then be
compared with the actual number surviving to give an indica-
tion whether an abnormal loss was associated with the Artery
dislocation.
The full details of the development of the normal sur-
vival figures are reported in Appendix I, and only brief com-
ments on this process will be made here. The general process
hinges on the development of normal annual discontinuance rates
which can be applied to a group of firms with the particular
characteristics of the Artery group. Once these rates have
been developed, they can be applied by a simple process of
year-by-year subtradtion of the annual expected number of dis-
continued firms from the Artery group. The end result is the
number of firms which might have been expected to survive
after a seven and one-half year period had elapsed under avep1
age national conditions.
K1ey to this process is the adjustment of annual discon-
tinuance rates to take into account the particular charac-
teristics of the Artery group. Briefly, three adjustments
have to be made, one taking into account the peculiar size
distribution of the Central Artery establishments, one taking
into account their age structure, and one taking into account
the different survival rates for separate types of business
activity. National reports show clearly that discontinuance
rates are lower (and survival therefore higher) among larger
and older firms. They also show that survival tends to be
above average for wholesalers, lower than average for manu-
facturers and just about average for retailers. The adjust-
ment for size is particularly notable, since it compensates
for the fact that use of DES data eliminates from consider-
ation some 300 smaller firms, thus skewing upward the size
distribution of the Artery group in comparison with the over-
all national picture. The adjustment for age takes into ac-
count the fact that Artery firms seemed to be generally of
above-average age. The adjustments for the differential rates
apparent among the manufacturing, wholesaling and retailing
groups makes it possible to develop comparisons for these major
sub-categories.
It must be pointed out that these adjustments represent
4 Ibid.
only educated guesses. The results reported in Table Six must
therefore be read only as approximations. To make the case as
valid as possible, the "normal survival"1 figures have been
computed under the most severe assumptions; that is, national
discontinuance rates have been adjusted as low as seemed
reasonable. This has the effect of pushing up the number of
firms which might have been expected to survive under average
conditions. Thus, while the national rate of discontinuance
averaged eight per cent per year, the figure developed on the
basis of the above-mentioned adjustments for application to
the Artery firms is four per cent. To make the case even more
severe a second set of "normal survival" figures has been
developed cutting the discontinuance rates applied to the
Artery firms in half, or from four to two per cent per year
for the over-all group. In effect, the net result of this
5The complete table of discontinuance rates, national and
Artery, is as follows:
National Artery Rates
rate* "Normal" "Normal"
Total 8% 4% 2%
Manufacturing 9% 3.5% 1.7%
Wholesaling 6% 3% 1.5%
Retailing 8% 4% 2%
* National rates are seven-year averages.
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process is to make it "easier" for the Artery group to show a
below-normal survival picture. The results of this process
are reported in Table Six, which includes the actual number
of firms surviving, the number that might have been expected
to survive at the estimated "normal" rate of discontinuances
and the number which might have been expected to survive if
this "normal" rate were over-estimated by as much as 50 per
cent.
Activity
Total
Manufact
Wholesal
Retail
TABLE SIX
COMPARISON OF ACTUAL AND "EXPECTED" SURVIVAL
(in ftermsof number-of esFabishmentsT
Actual Expected
at "normal" rates at -j "normal" rates
1+55 +22 493
uring 135 114 134
ing 205 182 212
55 70 84
Table Six seems to indicate that only in the retail com-
ponent was the survival significantly lower from what might
have been expected under normal circumstances. This fact adds
weight to the discussion of retail experience above. Even if
the most severe comparison is made, the picture is not sig-
nificantly different. In the grand total, for instance, the
difference between the maximum expected survival and the actual
2+9
survival is 38. The total number of Artery firms whidh failed
to survive was 118; therefore, under the extreme assumptions
only one-third of the Artery discontinuances can be attributed
to other than normal circumstances. Carried further, it may
be argued that even in the extreme case, the number of firm
deaths above normal expectations represents less than 7 per
cent of the total establishments dislocated. Assuming they
accounted for one-third of the employment in the non-surviving
group, the employment loss assignable to this group (approxi-
mately 263) is only four per cent of the total Artery employ-
ment. The author feels that this effect should not be con-
sidered inordinate.
To conclude, then, it does not appear that, except in the
area of retail activity, the number of firms which went out of
business to 1957 exceeded greatly - if at all - the number
which would have gone out of business in any case. This does
not mean that the greatest part of the 118 did not cease to
exist because of the forced relocation. In fact, they all
may have done so for this reason; but this we shall never know.
The conclusion correctly stated is that, even though all 118
non-surviving establishments may have gone out of business be-
cause of the Artery dislocation, it is probable that even if
there had been no Artery built a similar or not significantly
smaller number would have ceased to exist for other reasons.
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CHAPTER VII
GROWTH
Turning now to the establishments which did survive the
Central Artery dislocation, we shall deal first with the
general growth experience of this group. The treatment here
must necessarily be brief, since there is no simple comparison
that can be made to determine the real significance of this
factor. No data is available on a city, metropolitan or state
basis which can be used to develop a comparative picture. The
only figures that could be presented on these broader bases
are net figures, taking into account not only growth and de-
cline in firms which continued to exist through the given
period, but also losses and gains incurred as a result of firms
coming into and going out of existence and of firms moving into
and out of the given area. Obviously, for the Artery firms
which survived only the first two effects - gains and losses
in existing firms - are applicable; therefore, it seems in-
valid to make any general comparison between the growth figures
to be presented here for the Artery group and any other statis-
tics available. Some attempt at comparison will be made when
the over-all effect on the city itself is considered separately
in Chapter IX. In anticipation, the results of this comparison
will be summarized briefly at the end of this Chapter.
As Table Seven shows, the Artery establishments which
i A
TABLE SEVEN
GROWTH OF EMPLOYMNT IN SURVIVING FIRMS
Activity Enployment
At CA 1957 Per Cent Change
Total 6369 7193 /13
Manufacturing 3163 3605 /14
Meat (ND) 476 1034t /117
Other Food (ND) 560 304 -46
Apparel (ND) 619 728 /18
Printing (ND) 700 756 /8
Other RD 218 233 -6
Metal Products (D) 352 366 P4
Other Durable 208 184 -12
Wholesaling 2229 2701 /21
Meat 587 1022 /74
Other Food 426 423 -1
Apparel 256 208 -19
Metal Products 481 51+2 /13
Leather 238 2 7 /8
Other 241 2 9 /3
Retail 422 327 -23
Services 349 389 /11
Trucking & Trans. 132 105 -20
74 66Construction -11
survived grew 13 per cent in employment during the period 1950-
1957. Obviously, however, the pattern of growth and decline
was quite different among the various sub-categories of eco-
nomic activity. Here it should be noted that, in general, the
figures and differences involved are small and therefore must
be read with care. A number of tendenciesdo, however, appear
to be significant.
Most dramatic is the growth which took place in meat manu-
facturing and wholesaling. The surviving establishments in
these categories increased their employment 117 per cent and
74 per cent respectively. Indeed, growth in these two catego-
ries accounts for the greatest bulk of the over-all increase.
The immediate conclusion possible is that mere dislocation
need not necessarily damage business activity. This point
will be elaborated and carried further in succeeding chapters.
Other groups also showed apparently significant growth, inclu-
ding apparel manufacturing, printing, metal products, wholesal-
ing, and general service activities.
Contrasted with these growth trends, significant employ-
ment decreases took place in other food manufacturing, apparel
wholesaling, and retailing. The decline in food manufacturing
contrasts sharply with the increase in the meat categories and
provides part of the basis for a conclusion concerning the
differential effects of spatial movement to be dealt with later.
A
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The decline in retail employment, added to the heavy loss al-
ready noted by virtue of firms going out of business, adds
weight to the conclusion already reached that the retail
establishments were particularly hard hit by the dislocation.
No explanation is readily available for the differential ex-
perience of apparel wholesalers and manufacturers.
One interesting comparison possible is that between the
surviving establishments and those which did not survive as
shown in Table Eight. On an over-all basis, it appears that
the employment gain within the surviving establishments some-
what more than compensated for the loss sustained as a result
of business deaths. Since data on movement indicates that
only two establishments moved outside the metropolitan area
(as defined by the Greater Boston Economic Study Committee),
it is possible to conclude that no general loss was suffered
by the Boston region as a result of the Central Artery dis-
location.
Again, however, the picture within the detailed sub-
categories is diverse. In general, it appears that the em-
ployment experience of establishments in most categories either
compensated for, or did not add significantly to the loss due
to business deaths. Thus, in meat manufacturing and whole-
saling the dramatic growth among the surviving firms makes the
loss of employment incurred by virtue of establishment deaths
appear relatively insignificant. Much the same picture
TABLE EIGHT
COMPARISON OF EMPLOYMENT LOSSES THROUGH BUSINESS DEATHS
WITH E4PLOYMENT EXPERIENCE IN SURVIVING ESTABLISfENTS
Activity Employment Lost Net Employment Change
Through "deaths" In Surviving Establish.
Total 791 24
Manufacturing 2 8 442
Meat (ND) A9 1558
Other Food (ND) 21 .i256
Apparel (ND) 98 It109
Printing (ND) 1 56
Other ND 27
Metal Products (D) 6
Other Durable -24
Wholesaling 216 2
Meat 44 A35
Other Food 75
Apparel 18
Metal Products 43 461
Leather 9 19
Other 27 -8
Retail 25+ -95
Services 22 40
Trucking & Trans. 1+ -27
Construction -857
appears to be true for printing and to a lesser extent for
apparel manufacturing, metal products manufacturing and whole-
saling, leather wholesaling, and general services. Only in
other food manufacturing, other durable manufacturing, apparel
wholesaling and trucking were more jobs lost by virtue of de-
clines in surviving firms than were lost as result of business
deaths. In retailing, the additional loss sustained by virtue
of declines in surviving establishments was far less than that
caused by business deaths, but was nevertheless significant.
The conclusion here is that, in general, the employment shifts
among the surviving establishments either compensated for the
losses sustained when establishments went out of business or
did not add significantly to these losses. The bulk of the
damage caused by Artery relocation, therefore, appears to have
been related to firms going out of business. As we have al-
ready seen, this latter effect does not appear to have exceeded
significantly what might have been expected to occur even had
no forced relocation taken place.
Additional material which will be presented when the ef-
fects on the city of Boston are studied as a special case will
support the conclusion that Artery dislocation did not, with
the exceptions noted, generate employment shifts significant-
ly worse than what might have been expected to occur normally.
In fact, it will become clear that in a number of cases the
56
experience of the Artery establishments was better than that
which occurred in the city generally.
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CHAPTER VIII
SPATIAL MOVEMENT
Some 455 establishments or 79 per cent of the total in-
cluded in this study did move and survive through 1957. This
section will be concerned with the patterns of spatial redis-
tribution found to have occurred as a result of the movements
of these establishments. The first section will deal with a
description of the patterns of movement. The second will re-
late the picture of growth or decline in business to this pat-
tern of spatial movement. The final section will consider the
conclusions that may be drawn from this over-all picture.
The spatial analysis is based on movement within, or to,
three delineated areas as shown in Map 2. Area 1 is the down-
town of Boston as defined generally by the Greater Boston Eco-
nomic Study Committee. Area 2 includes the predominantly
wholesaling and light manufacturing districts which are con-
tiguous to the downtown or central core of the city. Area 3
includes the outlying areas of the city proper and the hinter-
land beyond. It should be noted that one of the key charac-
teristics imputed to Area 2, referred to as the frame of the
downtown, is close and immediate connection with the downtown
area. It is on this basis that the close-in areas of East Bos-
ton, Charlestown and Cambridge, separated as they are from
1Frame concept drawn from Horwood and Boyce, Measurements of
Central Business District Change, op.cit., p. 12f.
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Boston proper by the Charles River and the harbor, are placed in
Area 3, the hinterland, rather than being included in Area 2,
the frame. This also accounts for the peculiar, asymetrical
shape of Boston's frame area. The basic data describing the
pattern and magnitude of movements by the Central Artery estab-
lishments are summarized in Map 2 and Tables Nine, Ten and El-
even.
It appears obvious that a major portion of the surviving
Artery establishments, approximately two-thirds, remained in
the downtown area. Ninety per cent of those staying in the
downtown remained clustered in a tight band running one-quarter
of a mile along either side of the former Artery sites. The
next greatest concentration, approximately one-fifth of the
establishments which moved, was in the frame. Only 15 per
cent of the establishments moved outside these two central
areas into the rest of the city and the hinterland beyond.
When the dimension of employment is added, however, the
picture shifts significantly. While two-thirds of the estab-
lishments remained in the downtown, they accounted for less
than one-half of the total employment (47 per cent). The oh-
vious ccndusion is that the larger establishments tended to
move out, while the smaller ones remained close in. The dif-
ferences in the median sizes of firms remaining in the downtown
and those moving out confirms this conclusion immediately. For
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TABLE NINE
PATTERN OF SPATIAL MOVEMENT: ESTABLISHMENTS
Activity Area 1
No. %
Area 2
No. 
Area 3
No. %
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other ND
Metal Products
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
(D)
135
6
7
25
35
25
22
15
20
24
42
23
55
35
26
55
299 66 85 19 71
81
2
1
22
20
15
9
9
130
33
19
26
31
16
60
33
57
88
57
60
41
60
63
21
79
82
4+7
88
62
32
2
1
24
7
3
39
15
3
2
13
2
4
24
33
8
37
16
32
20
19
62
7
9
24
6
15
22
2
2
1
2-
6
6
3
36
4
6
2
16
2
6
15
16
33
29
4
6
24
27
20
18
17
14
9
29
6
23
48 87 2 ) 5 9
Services 41 32 78 5 12 1+ 10
Trucking & Trans. 9 5 56 2 22
5 50 2 20
,Total
Moving
2 22
10 3 30Construction
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TABLE TEN
PATTERN OF SPATIAL MOVEMENT: EMPLOYMENT
Activity Total
Moving
Area 1
No. %
Area 2
No. %
Area 3
No. %
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other ND
Metal Products (D)
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products-
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking & Trans.
6369
3163
476
560
619
700
248
352
208
2229
587
426
256
1+81
238
241
1+22
3149
132
2979 47
1261
100
11+6
536
156
110
79
134+
930
47
334
181
116
149
103
40
21
26
87
22
14
22
61+
42
8
78
71
24
63
1+3
2029 32 1361 21
1224+
329
368
44
280
90
7+
39
676
414
41
60
81
13
37
397 91+
39
69
66*
7
40
36
21
19
30
76
10
23
17
5
15
678
1+7
1+6
39
264
1+8
199
35
623
96
51
284
76
101
4 1 21 5
282 81 55 16
85 64* 31 24
12 3
16 12
Construction 74 24 32 39 53 11 15
NOTE: * Includes one very large firm.
21
10
8
6
38*
20
57
17
28
16
12
6
59
32*
42
~-~--~--'----~ 
- -- 
-
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TABLE ELEVEN
PATTERN OF SPATIAL MOVEMENT: MEDIAN SIZE OF FIRM*
Total
Activity Moving Area 1 Area 2 Area 3
Total 6.6 5.2 9.3 9.3
Manufacturing 9.9 8.6 15.7 16.7
Meat (ID) 49.0 --- --- ---
Other Food (ND) 27.5
Apparel (ND) 15.8 15.0
Printing (ND) 10.5 7.1 16.0
Other ND 6.1 5.5 --- 7.5
Metal Products (D) 9.2 6.3 7.5 19.9
Other Durable 8.8 8.1
Wholesaling 5.2 4.2 8.0 10.9
Meat 12.5 7.5 12.5
Other Food 4.9 5.3 --- 4.9
Apparel 3.8 3.7
Metal Products 4.9 3.4 4.6 11*7
Leather 4.0 3.7
Other 7.2 6.0 --- 9.9
Retail 4.8 4.9 --- 4.2
Services 4.3 4.2 7.5
Trucking & Trans. 9.2 8.5
Construction 7.5 7.5 7.5
NOTE: * No medians computed where less
than five firms in category.
1
63
the downtown, the median size was 5.2 employees; for Areas 2
and 3 the figure was 9.3. Once again, however, it appears that
the greater proportion of those moving outside the downtown
settled in the frame, and even in terms of employment, only
one-fifth of the total relocated moved outside the two central
areas. Clearly, there was a tendency for the larger firms to
move out of the downtown as a result of the forced relocation,
but there was an equally strong tendency for all firms to re-
main clustered in the central areas.
Looked at in detail, it becomes obvious that this general
experience did not hold true for all the different groups which
made up the total of Artery establishments. Turning first to
the manufacturing component, it appears that in general there
was a somewhat greater than average tendency for these estab-
lishments to move outside the downtown. Only 60 per cent of
manufacturing establishments and only 40 per cent of the em-
ployment in this general category remained in the downtown,
while the comparative over-all figures were 66 per cent and 47
per cent. Moreover, it appears here that the larger the firm,
the farther away from the downtown it tended to move. Thus,
the median size of establishments moving to Areas 1, 2 and 3
respectively were 8.6, 15.7 and 16.7 employees. Considering
the specific manufacturing categories, there are several not-
able variatIons from the general trend. Apparel manufacturers
remained almost entirely within the downtown. Metal products
manufacturers showed the greatest tendency to move out and
constituted the only manufacturing group to move significantly
beyond the frame. Within printing the dominant move measured
by employment was to the frame, indicating an exodus particu-
larly of larger firms.
The pattern in wholesaling is generally similar to that
found in manufacturing, although there appears to be a somewhat
greater tendency for establishments and employment in this
category either to remain in the downtown or to move beyond the
frame. The tendency for larger establishments to move farther
away from the downtown is even more evident within this group;
the median size of establishments moving to Area 3 (10.9) is
significantly larger than the median of those moving to Area 2
(8.0). Once again, however, the patterns found among the
several sub-categories are quite different. In meat wholesal-
ing the dominant move quite clearly was to the frame. Contras-
ted sharply with this was the tendency for other food whole-
salers to remain clustered in the downtown. This difference
is all the more striking when it is realized that both sets of
firms had been located in the same downtown market district.
Like their manufacturing counter-parts, apparel wholesalers re-
mained generally in the downtown, as did wholesalers engaged
in distributing leather products. The pattern of sharp outward
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movement found among metal products wholesalers parallels close-
ly the picture found in the manufacturing counter-part of this
category.
As might be expected, the ancillary retail and services
activities show a dominant tendency to remain clustered in the
downtown. Because of the smallness of the numbers involved, it
is difficult to make any conclusive statement concerning truck-
ing and construction, although the latter does show some ten-
dency toward movement out of the downtown and into the frame
area.
S'umihg up to this point then, it appears that there was
a significant tendency among the predominant makers and hand-
lers of goods, the manufacturers and wholesalers, to move out
of the downtown area in which they had been originally located.
For the most part, this movement was to the manufacturing and
wholesaling frame contiguous to the downtown. The movement
out was especially notable in activities which either have
special building requirements, as in printing, or which consist
of the handling of heavy bulk products, as in meat packing and
in metal products wholesaling and manufacturing. The excep-
tions to the general tendency, however, are as notable as the
cases in which it was followed. The three which clearly fall
under this heading are dealers in other food products, apparel
manufacturers and wholesalers, and leather handlers. These will
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be dealt with shortly. The ancillary retail and service acti-
vities which survived the dislocation showed a very understand-
able tendency to remain in the area where traditionally their
business had been.
Focusing on the manufacturing and wholesaling patterns of
movement, it is possible to unravel the diverse patterns one
step further. Clearly, there tended to be three separate types
of movement (Map 3). The first represented a clustering around
previously existing and traditional centers of the activity
within the downtown. The apparel, leather and other food estab-
lishments quite obviously followed this pattern. The second
pattern of movement was typified by the mass relocation of the
given activity to a new location within the frame. The clear-
est examples of this occurred among the meat dealers and the
larger printers. Finally, there was a third pattern of general
dispersal with particularly heavy movement into the frame and
hinterland area and out of the downtown. The movement of the
metal products wholesalers and manufacturers exemplifies this
pattern.
We must now ask whether the experience of the relocated
establishments was related to their differential movement pat-
terns. The measure we shall use to determine this is employ-
ment growth or decline. It must be pointed cut, however, that
in many of the detailed breakdowns, the numbers are so small
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that individual conclusions are highly tentative. To avoid
this somewhat, Areas 2 and 3 will be considered as a unit, and
comparison will be made only between experience within the core
and experience outside of it (Table Twelve).
In general, it appears that firms which moved outside the
core tended either to grow more, or to decline less than those
which remained in the core. Over-all, employment among the
firms which remained in the core showed no net change while
employment among the firms which moved outside the core in-
creased 24 per cent. In manufacturing, while there was a 10
per cent increase in core employment, outside the core, the
growth was 17 per cent. In wholesaling, the outside growth was
40 per cent while in the core employment decreased four per
cent. Since in the remaining activities, employment remained
so centered in the core or was so small to begin with, no com-
parisons can be made.
Looking at the manufacturing and wholesaling categories
in detail, it appears that where a significant number of cases
is available, the general pattern holds true. In most cases
one of three things happened: employment in the outer area
increased more than in the core area, as in printing; employ-
ment in the outer area increased, while it decreased in the
core, as in meat wholesaling; or, employment in the outer area
decreased less than in the core, as in other food manufacturing.
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TABLE TWELVE
PATTERN OF SPATIAL MOVENENT: EMPLOYMENT EXPERIENCE BY AREA
Activity
------- Area I-------
CA 1957 t'
Areas 2 & 3
CA 1957
combined
± 1
2979 2976 - 3 * 3390 4217 +827 + 24
Manufactur ing
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Printing
Other ND
Metal Products
Other Durable
Wholesale
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking, Trans.
Construction
1261
100
14+6
536
156
110
79
134
9-104+7334
181
116
149
103
397
282
1386
237
75
622
164
94
58
136
889
43
319
156
116
165
90
+125
+137
- 71
+ 86
+ 8
- 16
- 21
+ 2
-n
4+-
15 a
25 -
0
16 +
13 -
+ 10-
+137
- 9
+ 16
+5
S15
27
+ 1
1+
9
40
11
0
11
13
299 - 98 - 25
314 + 32 + 11
85 72 - 13 - 15
24 16 - 8 - 33
1902
376414
8
138273
74
92
75
36589
138
2219
797
229
106
592
1392
308648
1812
978
104
52
1+27
92
159
+317 + 17
+421 +112
-185 - 45**
+ 2 + 28
+ 489+ 9
+ 1 + 1
+ 35 + 13
- 26 
- 35
+51 + 40
+430 + 81
+ 12+ 13
- 23 - 31
+ 62 + 17
+ 3 + 3
+ 21 + 15
25 28 + 3+ 12
67 75 + 8+ 12
47 33 - 14 - 30
50 50 0 0
* Less than 0.5 per cent
** Decline exaggerated by large loss in one firm.
Total
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There were several exceptions to this pattern, that is,
cases in which experience outside the core was not as good as
that within the core. These occur in apparel wholesaling,
leather wholesaling, and other durable goods manufacturing.
If these several cases can be held aside for a minute, it ap-
pears possible to say that those firms which moved outward ten-
ded to do better than those which remained within the core and
that, therefore, the outward pattern of movement generated by
the Central Artery dislocation was a good one. Indeed, it may
be asked whether the experience of the firms which remained in
the core might not have been better, had they chosen to move
outward.
If we attempt to understand why the differential movement
patterns occurred, it will become clear why in most cases, out-
ward movement was beneficial and why, in a few exceptional
cases, the tendency to remain in the core was not detrimental.
The patterns of movement which were generated resulted from two
sets of factors: one, the developing characteristics of the
downtown area and, two, the characteristics of the establish-
ments themselves.
Three characteristics of the downtown must be noted. First,
the downtown is characterized by increasing congestion of move-
ment. Second, it is characterized by a decreasing amount of
usable loft space, and third, it is characterized by increasing
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rents, generated by the preceding factor and rising taxes. It
should be noted again that the Central Artery itself by remov-
ing upwards of five million square feet of usable floor space
contributed to these latter developments.
It appears clear that the Artery firms were generally of
the types which would be most affected by these developing
trends in the downtown. The firms which moved out had one or
several of the following characteristics:
1. They were larger than average users of space;
2. They had specialized space needs, particularly
a requirement for buildings with heavy floor
loads;
3. The markets they served tended to be at least
metropolitan;
4. As producers and distributors of goods, they
were particularly dependent on easy access to
and from their base locations;
5. Ranking as small businesses generally, they
were particularly sensitive to the cost of
space.
These, then, were precisely the firms which would be most ad-
versely affected by the trends in the downtown noted above.
In light of this discussion, how can the exceptions to the
beneficial effects of outward movement be explained? The simple
conclusion appears to be that in three of the cases noted - ap-
parel and leather wholesaling and other durable goods manufac-
turing - the benefits of being in-town were not outweighed by
2See Chapter VI, Footnote 2, page 41.
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the potential benefits of moving out of the core. In the case
of apparel, for example, we have an industry which is highly
dependent on being accessible to out-of-town buyers. We also
have an industry with highly flexible space requirements. The
first of these characteristics appears to make it necessary for
firms to be close to the area where buyers congregate, namely
the downtown. The second makes it easier for the firms to find
or to adapt space for their needs. Much the same is true for
the leather wholesalers, found in Boston, and of furniture firms,
which dominate the category "other durable manufacturing."
The experience in other food wholesaling stands as the ex-
ception which proves the rule. In this case we have .an activity
which remained clustered downtown, but suffered significant de-
cline. This experience stands in particularly sharp contrast
to that of the meat dealers. Undoubtedly the food dealers re-
mained in the downtown because they felt it would be unwise or
too expensive to move away from the traditional market district.
Thus, there was no organized movement within this group, as
there was among the meat packers, to seek a new location. The
results of this study indicate that this was an unwise decision,
and that, in fact, the food merchants, as major goods handlers,
might have done better to relocate outside the core of the city.
Reviewing briefly the patterns of spatial redistribution,
we have found that the dislocation caused by the Central Artery
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tended to force a movement outward from the core that was both
logical and beneficial to the firms involved. Looking at the
characteristics of the firms which moved outside of the core
and the evolving characteristics of the downtown, it appears
obvious, that with several logical exceptions, the activities
carried on by these establishments could be better performed in
less congested and more accessible locations. The experience
of the firms tends to validate this conclusion. The fact that
the bulk of the firms which moved out of the core remained clus-
tered in an area contiguous to the downtown indicates that a
location within the general central area is still desired by
the small manufacturers and wholesalers which dominated the
group under study. The key factors which must be maintained
within this peripheral area to keep it attractive are adequate
space, at a reasonable price, and adequate accessibility, both
to the downtown and the metropolitan hinterland.
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CHAPTER IX
IMPACT ON THE CITY
We turn now to a consideration of what effect the disloca-
tion has had on the city of Boston itself. This auestion has
particular relevance in light of the fact that Boston, like
many central cities, has been suffering a decline in business
activity over the past decade. This decline, with its contin-
gent loss of revenue to the city, has placed Boston in a deter-
iorating fiscal position and has led to a growing feeling of
pessimism concerning the future of the central area. The ques-
tion we raise here is to what extent the dislocation caused by
the Central Artery has contributed to this general decline.
At first glance it appears that the loss sustained as a
result of the Artery experience constituted a disproportionately
large part of the general decline suffered by the city between
1950 and 1957. All told, within this period, the city suffered
a net loss of an estimated 12,000 "covered" jobs and 2,500
1
"covered" business firms. Within the Artery group, the loss
suffered by the city as a result of establishments going out of
business or moving out of the city was 153 business units. The
net loss in employment, taking into account business deaths,
1These estimates are based on data developed by the Greater Bos-
ton Economic Study Committee from material supplied by the Mas-
sachusetts Division of Employment Security.
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out-migration and the additional factor of growth and decline
among the firms which remained in business within the city was
668 employees.2 Thus, it appears that the loss attributable
to the Artery firms accounts for approximately 6 per cent of
the city decline in firms and 5 per cent of the decline in em-
ployment. Since the Artery firms made up only 2 per cent of
the city's business population in 1950, it appears that the
share of the city decline attributable to them is dispropor-
tionately high.
It must be remembered, however, that the city figures are
net figures and include the effect of new firms coming into ex-
istence during the time period under study. Obviously, this
effect cannot be present in the Artery group. Unfortunately,
no figures are available either on the number of firms going
out of, or coming into existence in the city. Nor, is it known
how much of the decline in city business activity was due to
net out-migration of business firms. All these figures would
need to be known, if a true comparison were to be made. On a
national and state basis, it is known that the number of firms
coming into existence somewhat over-balances the number of firms
2 Once again, it must be noted that these figures do not include
the experience of an estimated 300 establishments known to have
been in the Artery area, but not covered by DES. Since, how-
ever, city data come from the same source and have the same
limitations, direct comparison between city and Artery figures
are talid.
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discontinuing business.3 Therefore, it may be assumed that the
gross loss suffered by Boston as a result of business deaths
and out-migration is significantly larger than the net figures
indicate. The 153 firms lbst as a result of Artery dislocation
would thus constitute a much smaller proportion of this more
comparable gross city decline.
One possible line of reasoning does lead to the conclusion
that the Artery dislocation did not cause a significant loss to
the city, at least in terms of jobs. We have seen that the
business deaths associated with the Artery group were probably
not significantly different from what might have been expected
under normal circumstances. If it may be presumed that busi-
ness births in the city followed the general trend, at least to
the extent of matching business deaths, then it may be assumed
that the Artery deaths were compensated for by the creation of
new firms. The "real" loss, then, caused by the Artery relo-
cation would be accounted for by out-migration. Since this
3U.S. Department of Commerce, Survey of Current Business, 38:24,
No. 8, August 1958; 36:8, No. 6, June 1956; and 3:11, No. 1,
January 1951+.
4If it may be assumed that Boston's rate of business discontinu-
ances was roughly similar to the state average, or about 15 per
cent below the national rate, then the city would have lost
approximately seven per cent of its existing firms each year.
The total business deaths during the period from the beginning
of 1950 through mid-1957 would have been roughly 13,000. The
Artery loss due to business deaths 118, would thus have accoun-
ted for less than one per cent of the total number of business
deaths during this period.
77
loss was more than compensated for by the growth of employment
among firms which remained in the city - 680 jobs gained ver-
sus 557 lost by out-migration - it might be argued that the
Artery dislocation did not add to, and in fact led to some com-
pensation for, the general decline suffered by the city. This
is tenuous reasoning, however, since it assumes that the entire
loss of 2,500 firms and 12,000 jobs suffered by the city be-
tween 1950 and 1957 was due to net out-migration. It is hard
to believe that this was the case, since it would have meant a
loss by net out-migration of over 300 firms per year.
It seems most valid to say that the Artery dislocation did
result in a net loss of jobs and establishments to the city.
Clearly, insofar as the forced move did drive firms out of
business or lead them to leave the city, the dislocation added
to the city's decline. It is known that in a number of cases
this was the specific cause involved. Counter-balancing this
force is a significant amount of statistical evidence that the
effect thus generated by the Artery dislocation was not much
greater than what might have been expected to happen nor-
mally. Therefore, it appears that, while the Artery disloca-
tion was a specific cause for loss of establishments and jobs
to the city, other factors would have caused a similar result
to occur even if the Artery had not been built.
Looked at in detail, it appears obvious that the bulk of
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the loss caused by the Artery occurred by virtue of establish-
ments going out of business. Tables Thirteen and Fourteen
summarize this data. Of the 153 firms lost, 118 or 78 per cent
were business deaths. Only 35 firms moved outside the city.
As might be expected from the preceding discussions, the firms
which went out of business were smaller than the average. There-
fore, while they accounted for more than three-quarters of the
loss of firms, they included only 59 per cent of the employees
lost (791 of 13+8).
The largest part of the loss by death of establishments
was attributable to the demise of retail establishments. These
deaths accounted for 37 per cent of the loss of firms and 32
per cent of the loss in employment. Significantly, the next
largest loss was suffered in other food wholesaling and manu-
facturing. Together these accounted for 16 per cent of the
establishment loss due to business deaths and 12 per cent of
the employment deaths. This appears to add weight to the con-
clusion reached in the previous chapter that the other food
component was adversely affected by poor relocation decisions.
Out-migration accounted for major loss only in metal
products manufacturing and wholesaling. Of the 35 firms
which moved outside the city, 11 or nearly one-third were in
these categories. Moreover, of the 557 employees lost by out-
migration, fully 57 per cent were in these two groups. The
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TABLE THIRTEEN
IMPACT Q1N CITY: ESTABLISHMENTS
Activity Tgtal CA
Establish-
ments
Loss by
Business
Deaths
Loss by
Out-
Migration
No. No. % No. No. %
Total
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other ND
Metal Products (ND)
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
573
157
7
12
29
36
30
25
18
21+2
29
56
24
65
38
30
100 118 100 35
27
1
2
5
6
3
1+2
5
10
4
11
7
5
22
1
514
1
15
14
10
19
1
1~431
4
3
3
31
4
12
1
8
3
3
10
1
0
1
1
3
3
1
17
1
3
2
8
1
2
100 153 100
29
3
0
3
3
9
9
3
49
3
9
6
23
3
6
32
2
5
2
8
6
1+
54
6
17
18
6
21
1
3
3
1
3
35
11
2
12
4
Retail
Services
99 17 44 37 3 9 1+7 31
8 6 5 1+ 11 10 7
Trucking & Trans. 12 2 3 3 1
Construction
3 4 3
0. 6 4
Loss:
Total
16 3 6 5 0
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TABLE FOURTEEN
IMPACT ON CITY: EMPLOYMENT
Activity Total CA
Enploy-
Loss by
Business
Loss by
Out-
Loss:
. ment Deaths Migration Total
No.* No%. / No. % No.,
Net In-City
Change
Total 7160 100
Manufacturing
Meat (ND)
Other Food (ND)
Apparel (ND)
Printing (ND)
Other ND
Metal Products (D)
Other Durable
Wholesaling
Meat
Other Food
Apparel
Metal Products
Leather
Other
Retail
Services
Trucking & Trans.
Construction
3401
556
581
717
701
275
358
213
2445
631
501
274
524
247
268
676
371
136
131
48
8
8
10
10
5'
3
314
9
7
4
7
791 100 557
238
80
21
98
1
27
6
5'
216
44
75
18
43
9
27
30
10
3
1
1
27
6
9
2
1
3
301
40
0
39
34
29
156
3
225
2
30
15
162
1
15
100 131+8 100
51+
7
0
7
6
5
28
1
40
*
5
3
29
*
3
539
120
21
137
35
56
162
8
441
46
105
33
205
10
42
40
9
2
10
12
1
33
2
15
1
3
9 254 32 16 3 270 20
5 22 3
2 4 1
12 2 34 3
3 1 71
2 57 7 0 0 57 3
* Less than one-half of one per cent.
1Net employment change among surviving firms remaining in the city.
2Loss: Total i Net In-city Change.
Net CA
Effect2
+680
+323
+507
-256
+103
+ 35
- 21
- 22
- 23
+4+46
+-432
- 9
- 33
+ 35
+ 16
+ 5
- 92
+ 38
- 27
-8
-668
-216
+387
-277
34
0
- 77
-184
- 31
+ 5
+386
-114
- 66
-170
+ 6
- 37
-362
+ 4
- 34
- 65
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remainder was scattered, for the most part, among the other
manufacturing and wholesaling categories.
Finally, we turn to the details of the net effect gener-
ated by the Artery dislocation on the city as shown in Table
Fifteen. Here a comparison is made between employment trends
in the city generally and changes attributable to Artery relo-
cation, taking into account employment lost through deaths and
out-migration as well as the growth or decline among establish-
ments which remained in the city. Once again, it must be poin-
ted out that the city trends are affected by the inclusion of
the effect of establishments coming into existence and moving
into the city during the period under study. As a result of
this, city trends are more Positively weighted than the Artery
trends. One may presume that if the effects of business births
and in-migration were excluded from the city figures, that is,
if they were made exactly comparable to the Artery figures, the
negative city trends would appear greater and the positive city
trends would appear smaller. The comparative figures should be
read with this in mind, since generally this adds weight to
the conclusions drawn. No adjustment has been made in city
figures, however, because of the unavailability of data.
It appears obvious that within all the ancillary categories
- retail, services, trucking and construction, the Artery ex-
perience was significantly poorer than that found in the city
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TABLE FIFTEEN
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT TRENDS (1970-o)
Activity Net Artery Change Boston City Trend
No. f%
Total -668 - 9 -3
Manufacturing -216 - 6 -15
Meat (ND) +387 +70 + 9
Other Food (ND) -277 -48 -11
Apparel (ND) - 34a -5 -14
Printing- (ND) 1 0 - 5
Other Non Durable2  - 76 -26 -27
Metal Products (D) -184 -51 -10
Other Durable - 31 -15 -10
Wholesling + O 1 - 6
Food +1 0 +19 -6
Metal Products3  - 67 -24 -11
Other4  -98 -9 -2
Retail -362 -54 -12
Services + 4 + 1 +17
Trucking - 16 -21 - 4
Construction - 65 -50 - 8
* Less than one-half of one per cent.
1Excluding publishing
2 1ncluding publishing
3Excluding brokers, agents, and manufacturers' sales branches.
'Includes all others, plus all brokers, agents, and manufac-
turers' sales branches.
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generally. The effect is particularly notable, as might be ex-
pected, in retailing, where the Artery group showed a 54 per
cent decline while the city suffered only a 12 per cent de-
cline. Insofar as it may be assumed that most of these activi-
ties drew their sustenance from the businesses and workers
located in the immediate Artery area, it is not hard to under-
stand why the excessive decline occurred. With over 150 firms
and more than 3,000 workers removed from this district, the
market for these activities became significantly smaller.
Looking at the manufacturing and wholesaling components,
the opposite picture appears to be true generally. Manufac-
turing establishments as a group showed a decline less than
half as large proportionately as that suffered in the city
generally (6 per cent versus 15 per cent). In wholesaling, the
city suffered a 4 per cent decline, while the Artery group
showed no change over-all.
Treatment of the detailed categories within wholesaling and
manufacturing is limited by the difficulty of developing compar-
able figures for all Artery categories; however, it does appear
that with some exception the experience of the individual Artery
groups was at least no worse than the experience of the compar-
able city groups. The Artery groups either showed gains greater
than the city's, as in meat manufacturing and wholesaling,
showed declines less severe than those experienced in the city,
as in apparel manufacturing, or showed trends little different
from the city's, as in other non-durable manufacturing. The
two activities to show trends distinctly worse than those found
in the city generally were metal products wholesaling and manu-
facturing and other food wholesaling and manufacturing. Previous
analysis indicates that this was true in the former case primari-
ly because of movement out of the city and in the latter case,
because of declines in employment among the firms remaining in
the city.
For reasons elaborated above, however, it may be argued
that in both these cases the relocation caused by the Artery
merely accentuated trends already operating within the industry.
Summarizing, then, it appears possible to say that while
the city probably did suffer some loss in terms of both estab-
lishments and jobs as a direct result of the relocation forced
by the Central Artery, the over-all effect was probably not
significantly worse, except in the area of retailing, than
might have been expected had the Artery not been built. In
fact, in several cases it appears that the growth experienced
by firms subsecuent to relocation compensated for the losses
suffered as a result of business deaths or out-migration, so
that in the dominant manufacturing and wholesale activities
the Artery firms as a group did better than the general run of
similar firms in the city.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSIONS
This study set out to determine the effects generated when
a large public works project like the construction of a major
highway is carved out of a central city area. The general ques-
tions raised for consideration were what happens to the business
establishments and the employment forced to relocate because
their previous locations are taken for the constriuction of the
new facility, and what can be learned from the experience of
these establishments. Three particular questions have been
posed:
1. Is the dislocation caused of sufficient magnitude
to require consideration?
2. Is there a significant loss sustained in terms of
establishments and employment to the area and to
the city so that the dislocation can be said to
have definite detrimental effects, whatever the
other benefits of the particular project may be?
3. Does the pattern of relocation engendered by the
forced removal reveal anything about the workings
of the urban community and does this pattern
appear to be positively or negatively related to
the future development of the urban community?
One question which has not yet been dealt with, but which will
be treated in the final pages of this concluding chapter, con,-
cerns whether the detrimental effects of the relocation might
not be mitigated while the beneficial effects are enhanced.
This question is naturally important to any complete consider-
ation of the adequacy of public policy; it is of special impor-
tance, however, to the establishments immediately concerned in
the relocation.
The construction of the Central Artery, a major highway
built through the eastern fringe of downtown Boston, has pro-
vided the specific occasion for this study. It is believed that
this is the first time that the dislocation effects of highway
construction have been studied particularly and in detail. As
has been pointed out, the implications of this study are relevant
not only to the problems surrounding the developing program of
highway construction, but also to the general movement to recon-
struct our central cities; that is, to urban renewal broadly
considered. Wherever reconstruction takes place, it is certain
that buildings will be demolished and activities will be forced
to relocate. The problems and effects of dislocation will in-
evitably arise. Looked at in this light, it makes little dif-
ference whether the new development is a highway, a business
center, or a residential complex. This study, while focusing
on the effects generated by a highway project, may therefore
stand as an example of a more general case.
_7
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It should be noted that this study deals with a particular
case and only part of the general problem. The Central Artery
caused relatively little residential dislocation and therefore
this topic has not been studied. Furthermore, the primary busi-
ness activities affected were in-town wholesaling and light
manufacturing and the services ancillary to these activities;
therefore little can be said of possible effects on the major
retail and office activities which predominate in the core of
the city. Finally, as is obvious, this study represents a con-
sideration of only one particular situation, and the conclusions
drawn must await validation by other studies of similar situ-
ations.
Recognizing these limitations and the weaknesses of the
data discussed in earlier sections of this paper, it, neverthe-
less, seems possible to draw certain useful answers to the ques-
tions stated above. First, it appears obvious that the disloc-
ation caused by this one reconstruction project was of sufficient
magnitude to require careful consideration. The Artery carved
out an area of approximately 45 acres in the core of Boston.
From this area, it is known to have displaced close to 600
business establishments and over 7,000 workers, representing
approximately two per cent of the city's entire business com-
munity.1 Clearly movements of such magnitude demand careful
IThe total number, including establishments and employment not
covered by DES, may be closer to 900 firms and 8,000 jobs (see
j
88
study and analysis, for, as this particular investigation in-
dicates, even one such mass relocation may have significant
effects on the pattern of activity carried on in the urban com-
munity. The need for study, analysis, and careful planning
becomes imperative when it is realized that in most major cities
mass relocation must occur not once, but many times over as
urban renewal projects begin to multiply. In Boston, for in-
stance, significant relocation has already been caused in three
instances - the Central Artery, the West End, and the New York
Streets projects. Two other projects, the Government Center
and the Inner Belt, promise to have effects at least as great
as any yet experienced. There can be no doubt that future pro-
jects will involve hundreds of businesses and thousands of wor-
kers. In the long run, it may very well be that a large and
perhaps a major pottion of the city's economic activity will
be directly involved in such forced relocation.
In answer to the second question, it appears that in
general the dislocation caused by construction of the Central
l(continued)Chapter III, pp. 20-21 and footnote 3). In addition,
it is important to note here that this study concerns only the
dislocation of firms from sites actually taken for the construe-
tion of the Artery. In the course of this study, the author has
learned that during the stormy and often uncertain genesis of
the Artery, a number of firms moved away from locations which
they thought would be taken for the road, but which were not
touched in the end. This fact of course raises interesting
questions concerning the effects generated when uncertainties
and delays are involved in carrying through major projects. Con-
ceivably, the anticipatory relocation stimulated by these fac-
tors was of significant magnitude. The study of this effect
while beyond the scope of this paper, should receive some atten-
tion in future studies.
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Artery probably did not cause a loss either to the metropolitan
area or to the city significantly greater than what might have
been expected to occur under normal circumstances. The rate of
survival found among the Artery firms generally does not seem
to have been abnormally low, and thus it appears that the Cen-
tral Artery dislocation did not cause an excessive number of
business deaths. Concerning out-migration, virtually no estab-
lishments moved beyond the borders of the metropolitan area
and, therefore, the loss to this area was nil. The city itself
lost only some 35 firms accounting for less than 600 employees
by out-migration, and the bulk of this occurred in the outward
movement of metal products wholesalers and manufacturers. Fur-
thermore, it seems that such employment loss as did occur was
compensated for by growth among establishments which remained
in the city. Looking at detailed effects on the city, the con-
clusion is drawn that, with the particular exceptions noted,
the experience in the activity sub-categories, as measured by
employment changes, was at least no worse and in a number of
cases better than trends found in the city as a whole. This
is not to say that the disproportionate losses suffered by the
city in retailing, other food and metal products activities
were inconsequential. One may explain the latter two in terms
of changing locational requirements which would probably have
caused a similar result in any case as time went on. In
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contrast to this, the loss in retailing does appear to be
directly related to the forced removal of so many businesses
and workers, and is therefore one loss that might not have
occurred had the Artery not been built. When the plusses and
minuses are added up, however, it does appear that the over-.
all loss to the city was not so great as to constitute a major
detrimental effect related to the construction of the Central
Artery.
Turning to the third question, it appears that the pattern
of relocation generated by the forced dislocation under study
does reveal something about the changes taking place in the
city's structure. There appears to be a tendency for major
segments of manufacturing and wholesaling to move outside the
core area. This occurs particularly in those activities which
no longer have major reasons for remaining in the core area or
which no longer are able to find adequate space at the right
price for carrying on business in this area. Most often these
reasons coincide. The lack of space, the high cost of space,
and the excessive traffic congestion of the central area act to
push these handlers of goods outward, while the expanding nature
of their markets and the easier access to market areas available
outside the core draws them to new locations in the fringe areas
of the city. The movement pattern found among the metal products
establishments exemplifies this trend most clearly.
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The key factor which appears to separate out those activi-
ties which remain in the core from those which move out seems
to be the need to maintain close and direct communication with
other business elements - either customers, buyers or sources
of information - which necessarily find their locus in the core
area. This factor appears to be clearly operative in the
apparel and leather activities. Both these activities need to
be immediately accessible to out-of-town buyers and to be close
to the sources of style information. The additional fact that
these establishments probably are better able to adapt space
to their needs, makes it easier for them to maintain central
locations. It would appear at first glance that the printers,
too, should fall into this group, for they, too, have need for
immediate and rapid connection with their dominant downtown
market. However, the space demands of this group tend to be
more stringent and therefore they are pushed out by their in-
ability to find adequate quarters at the right price in the
core. Not surprisingly, they tend to locate in the fringe area,
as close as possible to the core itself.
The differential growth patterns found among the firms
included in this study support the contention that the patterns
of movement generated were valid ones. Those manufacturing and
wholesaling firms which moved away from the congested core, did
better than those which remained in the center. Only where real
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ties to the center remained strong does it appear that business
experience as measured by employment validated the decision to
remain in-town. Indeed, in the one segment in which by the
reasoning presented above there should have been a strong out-
ward movement and was not, it appears that the business ex-
perience was notably bad. This, of course, was in the other
food group.
It appears, then, that the construction of the Central
Artery forced a significant outward movement of manufacturers
and wholesalers. This movement, far from being detrimental,
was beneficial to those who followed it. The question may be
raised whether in fact the effects of the Artery relocation
might not have been more beneficial had more establishments
chosen to follow this trend. In generalized terms, the Artery
experience leads to the conclusion that with few specific ex-
ceptions manufacturers and wholesalers are no longer best loca-
ted in the central core area. Bluntly, they do better in more
outlying areas. Nor is this conclusion without its sanguinary
implications for the core area itself. These activities with
the volume of truck traffic they generate, constitute one of
the major sources of congestion choking the life of the central
area. If it can be demonstrated, as appears to be the case,
that these activities do better when located outside the core,
then it may be hoped that in time the movement out will grow
i
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of its own accord and a major source of central area trouble
will be removed to the benefit of all concerned. Going even
further, this conclusion may argue for the institution of a
planned program of relocation in which firms are helped to find
new locations in the outlying areas of the city. It appears
that such a program would be justified, even to the extent of
providing some assistance to defray moving costs, since in the
long run it would benefit the city as well as the business con-
cerns themselves. Logically such relocation could be tied in
with redevelopment projects in the outlying areas. Thus,
blighted areas could be cleared and repopulated with the manu-
facturing and wholesaling activities whose relocation from the
core area is sought or is being forced. Certainly the idea is
worthy of further study.
This is particularly true in light of the fact that, in
the Boston area at least, sites cleared under urban renewal
programs have tended to go begging. Thus the New York Streets
project and the Cambridge Rogers Block project remain vacant.
It does not seem illogical to wonder whether these projects
might not have been more successful if some positive program
had been adopted of guiding firms forced to relocate from the
Central Artery area into these redevelopment areas.
Returning now to the central focus of this thesis, we have
argued to this point that the losses incurred as a result of
the forced relocation do not appear to have been significantly
large or abnormal when looked at in the overall and that the
pattern of relocation generated appears to have been beneficial
in its results. In toto, then, we have painted a rather happy
picture concerning the relocation caused by the construction
of the Central Artery. In doing this, however, we have tended
to obscure certain obvious facts. These pertain particularly
to the losses suffered by Artery establishments because of
forced relocation. Whether or not these losses, looked at in
broad perspective, were little different from what might have
been expected to happen normally, the fact remains that they
probably occurred in this case because of forced relocation.
This is true both for the firms which went out of business and
of the firms which appear to have lost business.
Conversations with many of the people involved in the re-
location confirm the fact that in many instances the mere costs
of moving ran into thousands of dollars for a single establish-
ment. Several businessmen reported costs running over $10,000.
In addition to these costs, a number mentioned the loss of
business experienced during the moving period, and several
noted the loss of customers who were unwilling to follow the
establishments to their new locations. In a number of cases,
there were significant additional costs involved in advertising
new locations. Clearly relocation involved major expenses for
A4
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the firms involved. It should be remembered that the bulk of
these firms were small, and there can be little doubt that
the costs of moving placed a particular burden on the limited
capital resources of these establishments. Large firms, how-
ever, were not immune from the damage caused by the costs of
moving. It is known that one large candy manufacturer almost
went into bankruptcy when faced with the cost of moving the
heavy machinery he used. Finally, it must be pointed out that
many of the firms incurred additional expense by virtue of the
fact that they were forced to pay higher rents in their new
locations. In great part, this circumstance is directly
attributable to the nature of the Artery relocation. Because
so many establishments were forced to move within such a
limited period, the demand for space was pushed unnaturally
high. At the same time, the construction of the.Artery elim-
inated several millions of sauare feet of available space.
With space demand high and the supply now more limited, it was
inevitable that rents would rise.
The crucial point is that all of these additional costs
were created for the Artery firms by a public decision from
which there was no recourse. It may be argued that forced
eviction is nothing more than another one of the normal pos-
sible consequences of doing business which all firms face.
After all, had these firms been forced out by private develop-
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ment, they each would have faced a similar situation. The
author must dissent frolm this argument. In the first place,
because the decision was a public one and because the bene-
fits of the new project, in this case a highway, were expec-
ted to accrue to the entire community, it seems that some
effort should have been made to limit the damage being caused
to private parties.
Beyond this, however, it seems obvious that part of the
costs generated, particularly the increased rents, were caused
by the sheer magnitude of the project - the fact that so many
were forced out in so short a time. It is doubtful that many
private projects would have this same effect. Finally, it
appears possible to argue that had some help been give, in
limiting the costs of moving and in easing the transition of
relocation, the detrimental effects of the dislocation might
have been diminished and the beneficial effects augmented. Cer-
tainly a level of good will would have been generated which
would have made easier the job of carrying through the project
under study and other future projects.
What particular things might have done? First, aid, either
in the form of loans or direct cash payments, might have been
made available to cover a major part of the moving expenses
for at least the smaller firms. This is the group whlhh suf-
fers most and where the greatest loss to the community occurs.
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In this connection, it should be noted that there is sound
precedent for instituting such a practice. Under the present
urban renewal procedures, businesses may receive up to $2,500
to defray their moving costs.2 Second, some similar system
might have been instituted to cushion the effect of higher
rents generated when the space market was suddenly glutted
with new demand at the very time the available supply was be-
ing diminished significantly. It is assumed that a system of
subsidy or loan would be more acceptable and easier to admin-
ister than a system of rent control. The same result might
of course be achieved by some system of tax abatement. How-
ever achieved, it is believed that such aid would significant-
ly relieve the damage caused to business establishments by
virtue of sudden and unexpected costs. It would also limit
the loss caused to the entire community when firms are(7either
forced to contract or go out of business because of their in-
ability to bear these costs. It is important to note that
this would be accomplished at a cost which seems small when
compared to the total amount expended for the project. In the
case of the Artery relocation, had the maximum allowance of
$2,500 now available under urban renewal been paid to each of
the establishments relocated the total cost would have been
2Housing and Home Finance Agency, Detailed Summary of the
Housing Act of 1957, HHFA, Washington, D.C., July 1957p. 6.
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about $1.5 million or somewhat under one and one-half per cent
of the total cost of the project. This cost seems nominal
enough in light of the results that might be achieved.
Indeed, in light of the apparent fact that in numerous
cases the costs of moving ran to substantially more than $5,000
and in some cases to substantially over $10,000, it may be
questioned whether the maximum allowance should not be doub-
led or even tripled with exceptional amounts above even this
general maximum being paid where very large firms are involved.
Perhaps a graduated scale, based on size and type of firm,
would be the most equitable system to adopt. In the case of
the Artery, it may be pointed out that even if the maximum
were tripled to $7,500 and even if this maximum had been paid
to all firms, an unlikely case, the total additional cost
would have been little more than four per cent of the cost of
the project.
There is some question whether such aid should be made
available to firms which own the buildings in which they
operate, since these firms do receive compensation in the form
of condemnation payments. Three points should be made in this
connection. First, the majority of the Artery firms were
space-renters, not space-owners, and therefore did not receive
even this compensation. Second, those who owned buildings
still received no compensation for the direct moving costs
99
they had to face, and it may be presumed that the monies they
received for their old ouarters were probably needed merely
to pay the cost of new space. Third, it must be pointed out
that while the space-owner firms seem at first glance to have
been in a better financial position to face the costs of re-
location because of the payments due them under the condem-
nation process, in fact this was not the case in many instan-
ces. Conversationswith Artery space-owners indicate that the
actual condemnation payments were delayed as much as two or
three years in many instances. These firms were thus faced
with a situation in which a large part of their capital was
unusable. Where this occurred, the firm was at least no bet-
ter off than the space-renter. It seems apparent that some
speed-up in the process of settling condemnation claims is
necessary. Failing this, some substantial aid, probably in
the form of a loan in anticipation of condemnation settlement,
should be made available to space-owners. But beyond this,
it seems that the general argument still holds true and that
space-owners, like space-renters, should receive some aid to
cover the direct costs of moving not included in condemnation
payments.
The final point we wish to make here is that much of the
damage caused by the dislocation might have been avoided and
positive assistance been given in helping the establishments
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to find and choose new locations. Going further, it may be
asked whether a definite plan of relocation might not have in-
creased the benefits which the laissez-faire pattern of reloca-
tion appears to have generated. Firms which might have been
expected to do better in locations outside the core could have
been counselled to choose such locations, and assistance might
have been given in the finding of such sites. Indeed, under
similar circumstances, it would seem that such a mass forced
relocation could be tied-in with renewal efforts. Perhaps
bonus moving-cost payments might be offered to firms which re-
located according to the pattern desired by the city.
The purpose of the above discussion has not been to develop
a detailed program of planned and aided relocation, but rather
to suggest the outlines of some practical approaches to the
resolution of this very real need. It will remain for future
studies to develop more fully what has been presented here only
briefly. The primary ideas the author has sought to convey are
that means are available and that the adoption of some program
is justified by the results which can be achieved. From a
minimum point of view, such a program of planned and coordinated
relocation would have the effect of diminishing the potential
for causing damage to private business. At the same time it
would help ease the ill-effects of congestion and chaotic land
use so prevalent in the core area. From a more positive point
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of view, it seems probable that such a program would in fact
improve the prospects for retaining and stimulating business
activity in the central area. At the same time the community
would be taking definite steps to foster the evolution of a
land use arrangement for the entire urban area which would be
more suitable to all its needs.
As our programs of reconstruction multiply in the future,
the magnitude of forced relocation is bound to grow. This
study has indicated that such relocation has not had severe ad-
verse effects in at least the one case reviewed. While the dis-
location was of significant magnitude, it did not cause a major
loss of establishments and employment above what might have
been expected normally. Beyohd this, the pattern of space use
it seems to have generated appears to make more sense than
that which obtained originally. Finally, the assertion has
been made that the process of relocation offers an opportunity
for communities to foster business movements which would be
beneficial not only to the particular establishments involved,
but which would also have the effect of bringing into existence
a more efficient and productive land use pattern.
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APPENDIX I
Computation of "Normal" Survival Rates
In computing "normalt" survival rates to provide a base for
judging the significance of Central Artery survival rates,
national figures from the Survey of Current Businessi were used.
The actual figures used were the various national annual rates
of discontinuance of business firms; thus, the final survival
figures were arrived at by a process of subtractions of expec-
ted number of discontinued firms year by year from the actual
number of Artery firms in existence as of 1950. The result of
the compounded subtraction produced the "expected normal" fig-
ures presented in Table Six.
Before this process could be carried through, the national
rates had to be combined and adjusted to take into account three
factors:
la. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "Growth in Business Concerns," Sur-
vey of Current Business, (Washington, D.C., Vol. 38, No~~T,
Auguis 195Z, p. 24.
b. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, "Concerns in Business and Their
Turnover," Surv of Current Business, Washington, D.C.,
Vol. 36, No. 6, June 1956, p. 8 .
c. Betty C. Churchill, "Recent Business Population Movements,"
Survey of Current Business, U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Washing-
ton, D.., Vol. 34-, No. 1,January 1954, pp. 12, 13.
All statistics reported as estimates based primarily on data
supplied by the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education and Welfare,
Bureau of Old Age and Survivors Insurance.
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1) the age of firms
2) the size composition of the Artery group
3) the different types of activities
Discontinuance rates vary along all three of these dimensions,
The specific steps were as follows*
1. Rates according to age of firms were used as the base,
since this was the only case in which a single figure was re-
ported for all firms. It also represents the most unknown fac-
tor. No data was available or gathered on the age of Artery
firms, and this imposes the greatest difficulty in arriving at
a final conclusion. Furthermore, the only series of discon-
tinuance by age of firms found, did not extend beyond 5.5
years of age. All the results reported must be read with this
in mind.
The annual rate, of discontinuance found for firms 5.5
years old was 11 per cent.2 Tentative results of a question-
naire sent to Artery firms indicated indirectly3 that this group
was generally above average in age. With this in mind, the base
rate of discontinuance decided upon was 5 per cent or somewhat
2Betty C. Churchill, "Survival Patterns of the Postwar Business
Population," Survey of Current Business U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Washington, D.C., Vol. 32, No. 12, p. .
3The particular question asked concerned the number of years the
firm had been located at its Central Artery address prior to
moving. This gives a minimum estimate of age of firm.
less than half of the 5.5 year rate. It must be emphasized that
this represents only a guess, since the actual age compositicmi
of the Artery firms was not known, nor was it known how fast
the national discontinuance rates drop past the 5.5 mark. To
further take into account possible error in this guesswork, a
second set of rates were developed, using 2.5 per cent as a base
discontinuance rate.
2. Annual survi
from data reported i
For the two-year per
0-3 employees
4-7 t
8-19
20+
It
"
These were converted
of the overall avera
series:
val rates by size of firm were developed
n a study of the two-year period 1949-1950.4
iod these rates were as follows:
-- 17 per cent
-- 10 per cent
-- 8.3 per cent
-- 7.3 per cent
to an index basis, by dividing each rate
ge, 15 per cent. This gave the following
0-3 employees --
4-7 --
8-19 --
20+ --
113
67
55
'+Betty C. Churchill, "Size Characteristics of the Business Popu-
lation: 19 44-51,"l Survey of Current Business, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Washington, D.C., Vol. 32, No. 1, p. 12.
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These indexes were then multiplied by the base figures, based
on age of firms to give rates on the basis of size class. The
results for the 5 per cent base were as follows:
0-3 employees -- 113 (index) x 5 = 6 per cent
4-7 -- 67 (index) x 5 3 per cent
8-19 -- 55 (index) x 5 3 per cent
20" -- 35 (index) x 5 2 per cent
3. After "normal" rates of size classes were developed,
these were applied to the size composition of the Artery firms
to develop an overall "normal" discontinuance rate to be used
on this group. This involved weighting the size-class rates by
the percentage of Artery firms in this class. The process for
all firms was as follows,
size class % of Artery firms x Discontinuance Rate =
0-3 -- 38% 6% 228
4- -- 26% 3% 78
8-19 -- 22% 3% 66
20+ -- 14% 2% 28
400 4
100
Thus the overall adjusted rate was found to be 4 per cent. This
rate was then applied to the total of 573 Artery firms on a
year-by-year basis over a 7.5-year period to arrive at the Itex-
pected" number of surviving firms; that is, 4 per cent of 573
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was subtracted from the total for the first year, 4 per cent
of the new total, 550, was subtracted from this new figure to
give the second year loss, etc. The final total, as reported,
was an expected survival of 422 firms.
As a final step, this same process was followed using
the " rate" figure for annual rate of discontinuance, 2 per
cent. As is reported in the text, this 2 per cent is by co-
incidence roughly one-quarter of its overall national rate (8
per cent).
4. The same process was followed for each of the three
sub-categories reported - manufacturing, wholesaling, and re-
tailing. First, each group has its own peculiar size compo-
sition. This was taken into account in Step 2. Second, it
was found the general discontinuance rates for these classes
varied according to activity. This was taken into account by
adjusting the size class figures by the per cent above or be-
low the general average each group tended to be normally. The
general annual discontinuance rate reported5 for all groups
over a six-year period, 1952-1957, was 8 per cent; for manu-
facturing, 9 per cent; for wholesaling, 6 per cent; for re-
tailing, 8 per cent. On this basis size class figures were
adjusted up 12.5 per cent (1/8) for manufacturing, down 25 per
cent (2/8) for wholesaling, and left the same for retailing.
5Based on data cited in Note 1 above.
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The computation for wholesaling is given below as an example.
(General dis- Adjusted discon-
size class I of CA firms continuance rate) tinuance rate
0-.3
4-'/
8-.19
20
40
26
24
10
x
x
x
x
(6)
(3)
(3)
(2)
4.5
2
1.5
180
52
48
495-
TO 3%
The annual discontinuance rate used was, thus, 3 per cent for
wholesaling; the i rate was 1.5 per cent. These rates were then
applied to the 1950 total of Central Artery firms engaged in
wholesaling, as described generally above. The complete table
and * rates is as follows:
Actit normal" rate "normal"rate
Total 4 2
Manufacturing 3.5 1.7
Wholesaling 3 1.5
Retailing 2
How accurate these rates are is impossible to say. Some data
has come to hand more recently from state sources which provides
additional material, but this is not conclusive. The Massachu-
setts Bureau of Corporations reports that in 1958, ten per cent
of the state's corporations were dissolved. Taking into account
that 1958 was a recession year, this is in line with national
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discontinuance rates. The State Department of Labor and In-
dustries has supplied figures on manufacturing which indicate
that the state discontinuance rate in this category varied
between 2.5 per cent and 3 per cent during the period 1950--
1956, with the seven-year average being 2.8 per cent. Since
it is not possible to adjust the figures for age and size of
firm, no exact comparison is possible with the rates developed
for this study. Compared to the national average, the state
figure appears low, however. (9 per cent versus 3 per cent.)
This might indicate either that the national figures are all
too high or that the state figures are inordinately low. Sur-
vey of Current Business figures indicate that the Massachu-
setts rates of discontinuance are generally somewhat below
the national average (approximately 15 per cent), but the dif-
ference noted above is quite in excess of this.
If the figures reported by the Department of Labor and
Industries are the more accurate measure of reality, then the
rates used in this study, based as they are on higher national
rates, are probably too high. With this in mind, it is proba
ably safest to use the survival figures computed on the i "nor-
mal" rate basis for checking the conclusions of this study.
6Betty C. Churchill, "State Estimates of the Business Popula-
tion: 1944-51," Survey of Current Business, U.S. Dept. of
Commerce, Washington, D.C., Vol. 32, No. I, p. 12.
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It should be pointed out that the rate used in manufacturing
(1.7 per cent) is still quite a bit below the Labor and Indus-
tries figure of 2.8 per cent. It must be pointed out, however,
that if the same corrections for age and size used above were
applied to this 2.8 per cent state average, the result would
probably be significantly lower than 1.7 per cent. The rate
could be as much as 50 per cent lower. This would increase
the number of firms expected to survive and weaken the conclu-
sion drawn, namely that the survival experience of the Artery
firms was not significantly worse than what might have been
expected to occur normally. On this basis, for example, some
60 per cent of the Artery loss by deaths would have to be con-
sidered loss above "normal" loss - assuming a "normal" dis-
continuance rate as low as 1 per cent. This would clearly be
a significant difference, since even by the lower rate used
in the body of this study, only one-third of the loss could be
considered abnormal. Unfortunately, there appears to be no
sure way to resolve this problem. The author has presented in
the study what he believes to be a reasonable case.
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